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CARLISLE v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP. AND JUSTICE GINSBURG'S
DISSENT: STRIKING AN EQUITABLE COMPROMISE
BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF LABOR AND
MANAGEMENT REGARDING FEIA
LIABILITY FOR WORK-RELATED STRESS
AUTHOR'§ NOTE
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently authored a compelling dissent
in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall (Gottshall II),1 arguing that the Federal
Employers Liability Act (FELA) should be extended to permit actions for
negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from work-related stress.
2
Largely relying on the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for
1. 114 S. Ct..2396 (1994).
2. See Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2419 (concluding thatThird Circuit in Carlisle
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994), correctly determined that plaintiff's
stress related injuries were compensable under FELA). In Gottshall II, the United
States Supreme Court overturned the Third Circuit's holding in Carlisle that per-
mitted recovery under FELA for genuine and foreseeable emotional injuries. For
a discussion of Carlisle's factual background, see infra notes 121-35 and accompany-
ing text. The majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, rejected the genuiness/
foreseeability threshold established by the Carlisle court for emotional injury claims
brought under FELA. Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2408. For a discussion of the Carlisle
court's genuineness/foreseeability threshold, see infra note 169 and accompanying
text. The Court, instead, adopted the "zone of danger" threshold for emotional
injury claims brought under FELA, a traditional common law test used to limit
recovery on claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Gottshall II, 114 S.
Ct. at 2410. For a discussion of the traditional common law tests used to limit
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, including the zone of dan-
ger test, see infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text., The Gottshall II Court
found Carlisle's foreseeability/genuineness threshold to be "fatally flawed in a
number of respects." Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2410. First, the Court disagreed with
the Third Circuit's refusal to apply the traditional common law limits for negligent
infliction of emotional distress in the FELA context. Id. at 2409. The Gottshall II
Court concluded that such common law limits on negligent infliction of emotional
distress "play a vital role" in defining the scope of a railroad's duty under FELA to
protect its workers from emotional injuries. Id. Second, the Gottshall II Court
questioned the viability of the Carlisle court's foreseeability/genuiness threshold
for FELA claims because such an approach was "bound to lead to haphazard re-
sults" and the "possibility of infinite [FELA] liability." Id. Asserting that "every in-
jury has ramifying consequences'... without end," the Court maintained that a
foreseeability standard would fail to properly limit the scope of potential FELA
liability. Id. For a discussion of why the possibility of "infinite liability" does not
arise in the FELA context, see infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text. Finally,
the majority in Gottshall 11 rejected as "unprecedented" the Carlisle court's decision
to'permit recovery under FELA for work-related stress. Gottshall II, 114 s. Ct. at
2409. Finding no support in the common law for the Carlisle holding, the Gottshall
Court concluded that such a decision would "dramatically expand employers'
FELA liability" and make railroads the insurers of their employees' mental health.
Id.
(197)
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the Third Circuit in the companion case to Gottshall II, Carlisle v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp.,3 Justice Ginsburg rejected the majority's attempt to limit
the scope of compensable emotional injuries under FELA.4 In particular,
she objected to the Court's exclusive use of the "zone of danger" test in
determining whether negligent infliction of emotional distress is cogniza-
ble under FELA. 5 Finding that the Court's restrictive common law test
"leaves [some] severely harmed workers remediless," Justice Ginsburg
maintained that the threshold test, instead, should be based upon the
"genuineness and gravity of the [railroad] worker's [emotional] injury."6
This threshold test was first outlined by the Third Circuit in Carlisle.
7
,
In view ofJustice Ginsburg's reliance upon the Third Circuit's reason-
ing in Carlisle, a detailed examination of the Carlisle court's opinion will
provide additional insight into the bases for her dissent in Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Gottshall.8 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed three main po-
sitions taken by the Third Circuit in Carlisle 1) the zone of danger test is
not the "appropriate" test to be applied to FELA claims for negligent in-
3. 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gott-
shall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
4. Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2418-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority
restricted the scope of compensable emotional injuries under FELA by selecting
one of the common law tests that state courts have applied to limit recovery by the
public for negligently inflicted emotional distress. See id. at 2408-09 (maintaining
that common law tests regarding scope of recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress play "vital role" in defining extent of railroad's duty under FELA to
avoid inflicting emotional injury). For a discussion of the various common law
tests applied by state courts to limit recovery for emotional distress claims, see infra
notes 140-45 and accompanying text. The Court then adopted the "zone of dan-
ger" test for limiting recovery under FELA for negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress. Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2410-11.
5. Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2419 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
cited the "fear of 'infinite liability' to an 'infinite number of persons' " as the ma-
jority's principal reason for adopting the zone of danger requirement for FELA
claims of emotional distress. Id. at 2418 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Con-
solidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2409 (1994)). Noting that the
broad language of FELA demands broad coverage, Justice Ginsburg observed that
the majority's concern of infinite liability should not control in the FELA context
because "the class of potential plaintiffs under the FELA is not the public at large."
Id. at 2412 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She maintained that FELA "covers only rail-
road workers who sustain injury on the job." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 2419 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg found the zone of
danger test too restrictive because Congress, in legislating FELA, gave the courts
wide discretion to "fashion remedies constantly 'liberal,' and appropriately 'en-
larged to meet changing conditions'" in the railroad industry. Id. at 2418 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (quoting Kernanv. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432
(1958)).
7. See Gottshall I, 114 S. Ct. at 2409 (declaring as unprecedented Carlisle hold-
ing that railroad employers have duty to avoid creating stressful work environ-
ment); see also Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97-98 (upholding for first time claim under
FELA for negligently inflicted emotional distress arising from work-related stress).
8. 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning in
Carlisle, see infra notes 136-73 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39: p. 197
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss1/5
fliction of emotional distress;9 2) railroad employees with "genuine" and
"grav[e]" emotional injuries must not be left "remediless;"10 and 3) FELA
is a broad remedial statute that must be "enlarged to meet changing con-
ditions... [within] the [railroad] industry."11 This Note provides an in-
depth analysis of the foregoing three points from the perspective of the
Third Circuit's decision in Carlisle.12 First, this Note asserts that a majority
of states have advanced beyond the restrictive "zone of danger" require-
ment and have permitted more liberal recovery on claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.1 3 Second, this Note expands on Justice
Ginsburg's view that FELA must "fashion". remedies that are responsive to
the changing conditions of the railroad industry;14 this Note asserts that
the emotional dangers of overworking railroad employees are becoming
more problematic than the physical dangers inherent in railroad opera-
tions.1 5 Finally, similar to Justice Ginsburg's dissent, this Note concurs
with the Third Circuit's decision in Carlisle and maintains that the Carlisle
decision offers an equitable remedy for emotional injury claims because it
respects the interests of both railroad labor and management. 16
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress established the Federal Employers Liability Act 17 in 1908 to
provide a federal remedy for railroad employees injured as a result of their
9. Gottshall I, 114 S. Ct. at 2418 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
11. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,
355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958)).
12. See Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that plaintiff may recover under FELA for "negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress arising from work-related stress"), rev'd sub nom. Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). For a discussion of the Carlisle holding
and its underlying reasoning, see infra notes 136-73 and accompanying text.
13. See Gottshall If, 114 S. Ct. at 2418 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (observing that
zone of danger test is inconsistent with common law tests applied by some state
courts). For a discussion of the common law tests applied in a majority of states,
see infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
14. See Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2418 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) ("[O]ur charge
from Congress is to fashion remedies constantly 'liberal,' and appropriately 'en-
larged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty to-
ward its workers.'" (quoting Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432
(1958))).
15. For a discussion of the.growing risks of stressful working conditions within
the railroad industry, see infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of why the Carlisle holding offers an equitable remedy
that respects the interests of both labor, and management, see infra notes 174-97
and accompanying text.
17. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (Supp. IV 1992). The United States Supreme Court origi-
nally struck down the FELA legislation in Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S.
463 (1908), on the ground that FELA interfered with intrastate commerce. Howard,
207 U.S. at 501-03. Congress subsequently enacted another version of FELA in
1908, which applied exclusively to interstate commerce. See Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35
Stat. 65 (1908) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (Supp. IV 1.992)).
1994] NOTE
3
Shields: Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp. and Justice Ginsburg's Dissen
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
employer's negligence.1 8 In 1907 alone,, over 11,000 railroad employees
were killed on the job,1 9 while an additional 88,000 suffered injuries.20
Confronted with such alarming statistics, Congress enacted FELA primar-
ily to encourage drastic improvements in employee safety and to provide
adequate compensation for families of injured employees. 2 1 As a result,
FELA was a practical response by Congress to the realities of the railroad
industry in the early 1900s. 22
FELA enables railroad employees to recover in tort for any injuries
suffered as a result of railroad negligence. 23 Recognizing FELA's remedial
18. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.'.,. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561 (1987). For
the pertinent text of FELA,- see infra note 44.
19. Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, The Federal Employers' Liability
Act, a Bane for Workers, a Bust for Railroads, a Boon for Lauyers, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1, 3 (1986).
20. Id.; see Gary Taylor, Truth, Justice, and FELA: Two Sides, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 30,
1990, at 27 (reporting that in 1907, 88,000 railroad workers were injured and 4,500
were killed). At the turn of the century, the railroad industry was responsible for
one of the highest rates of employee accidents in United States history. Hines v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 1991). The average remaining
life expectancy of a switchman was barely seven years; a brakeman had an 80%
chance of dying from injuries sustained on the job. Taylor, supra, at 27.
21. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 19, at 2. Congress enacted FELA to
enable injured workers or widows of railroad workers to pursue compensation,
provided such litigants asserted meritorious claims. Buell, 480 U.S. at 561.
Although plaintiffs frequently sought recovery only for lost wages, their recovery
was not limited solely to such damages. See Jerry J. Phillips, An Evaluation of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 49, 60 (1988) (noting that,
unlike state workers' compensation, FELA allows recovery for "[plain and suffering
and diminished enjoyment of life"). Consistent with common law tort principles,
FELA enables plaintiffs to recover damages for such injuries suffered as a result of
employer negligence. 45 U.S.C. § 51. As subsequently amended, FELA also bene-
fits workers by, inter alia: 1) eliminating the assumption of risk defense often used
by a railroad to foil an employee's claim, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939) (codified at 45
U.S.C. § 54 (Supp. IV 1992)); and 2) establishing a three year statute of limitations
for an employee's personal injury claim, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939) (codified at 45 U.S.C.
§ 56 (Supp. IV 1992)), which was generally one year longer than the standard two-
year limitation period for personal injury torts asserted in state courts. See Phillips,
supra, at 51 (observing that Congress established three-year statute of limitations
for FELA).
22. See Phillips, supra note 21, at' 50 (noting that in response to appalling
number of injuries and deaths suffered by railroad workers, Congress passed FELA
to provide reasonably reliable tort compensation system). Prior to FELA, railroad
workers had little power to bring about changes in their employment conditions
because labor unions were virtually nonexistent and railroad labor was cheap and
in abundant supply. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 19, at 3. In contrast, the
railroad industry was extremely powerful. See Taylor, supra note 20, at 27 (describ-
ing railroads as dominant American industry during early twentieth century). In
addition to being the dominant employer in the United States, railroads were vi-
tally important to the economic growth of the country. See id. at 27 (noting that
railroads were not only dominant in American industry but were important in ex-
pansion of American frontier).
23. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181-82 (1949) (finding that wording
of FELA is not restrictive as-to particular type of injury suffered); see also Buell 480
U.S. at 565 (recognizing that FELA provides employees substantial protection
[Vol. 39: p. 197-
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NOTE
and humanitarian purpose, the United States Supreme Court has consist-
ently interpreted the term "injury" in FELA as "all-inclusive." 24 However,
as employees began to sue railroads for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, it became unclear whether FELA provided a remedy for emo-
tional injuries.2 5 A great debate emerged among the lower courts as to
whether emotional injuries were compensable under FELA.2 6 As a result,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway v. BuellJ 27 to consider the issue.28 The Buell Court de-
against railroad negligence and meaningful remedy for injuries caused by such
negligence); Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 1993)
(acknowledging that FELA was enacted in broad terms to enable liberal recovery
for employees who suffer injuries caused by railroad negligence), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
2396 (1994). For a discussion of the Urie decision, see infra notes 50-54 and ac-
companying text.
24. Urie, 337 U.S. at 180-81; see Bueli 480 U.S. at 561-62 (recognizing that
FELA is a remedial statute that has been construed very broadly); Rogers v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (finding that FELA cases should go to
jury if evidence justifies conclusion that "enployer [sic] negligence played any part,
even the slightest," in producing employee's injury); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281
U.S. 635, 640-41 (1930) (noting that in spirit of broad construction, courts have
construed FELA to cover some intentional torts even though FELA is a negligence
statute).
25: Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 1990) (ob-
serving that after Buell "it is not clear that the FELA was intended to provide for a
recovery" in emotional distress cases), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1090 (1991); Adams v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 1990) ("The application of FELA's
negligence standard to claims for purely emotional injury remains an unsettled
matter."); see Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., 2 F.3d 480, 482 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating
that FELA does- not distinguish between claims alleging physical or emotional in-
jury); Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R., 823 F.2d 693, 694 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that
Buell decision left door to recovery for emotional injuries "somewhat ajar" but not
"wide open").
26.- See, e.g., Puthe, 2 F.3d at 483 (declining to decide standard for type of
injury or misconduct required to establish claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress under FELA); Gottshall 988 F.2d at 358 (holding that negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress is cognizable under FELA in certain circumstances);
Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Plaisance
I] (modifying previous holding that purely emotional injuries were compensable
under FELA and leaving question to more appropriate fact pattern in future), mod-
ifying 937 F.2d 1004 (1991) [hereinafter Plaisance 1], cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604
(1992); Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704, 705 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that "physical contact or threat of physical contact" is required to recover under
FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 914
(1992); Elliot v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 910 F.2d 1224, 1229 (4th Cir. 1990) (refusing to
decide whether FELA permits recovery for purely emotional injuries without addi-
tional physical symptoms); Adams, 899 F.2d at 539 (declining to decide whether
FELA provides cause of action for purely emotional injuries); Moody, 823 F.2d at
694 (refusing to address issue of whether emotional injuries' are compensable
under FELA); Buell v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 771 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th
Cir. 1985) (holding that purely emotional injuries are cognizable under FELA),
aff'd on other grounds, 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
27. 480 U.S. 557, 561 (1987).
28. .Id. at 568 (noting that issue of whether emotional injuries are cognizable
under FELA is not purely question of statutory construction).
1994]
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clined to establish a bright line test for analyzing emotional injury claims
brought under FELA.29 Instead, the Supreme Court invited the circuit
courts to explore the possibility of recovery for emotional injuries under
FELA in light of common law developments in tort jurisprudence. 30
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed
the issue of whether emotional injuries are compensable under FELA in
Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp.31 In Carlisle, a railroad employee brought
an action against Conrail in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
32
The employee alleged that he had been subjected to dangerous and stress-
ful work conditions over a period of four years. 33 Following a jury trial,
the employee was awarded damages of $386,500. 34 Conrail subsequently
moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the em-
ployee's emotional injuries were not cognizable under FELA.35 The dis-
trict court denied the motion and Conrail appealed. 36 Affirming the
district court's decision, the Third Circuit held that emotional injuries are
compensable under FELA when caused by extended exposure to danger-
ous and stressful working conditions.
3 7
This Note will examine the development of recovery for emotional
injuries under FELA. 'As background, Section II of this Note analyzes the
differing views taken by the Supreme Court and several circuit courts con-
29. Id. at 570.
30. Id. at 568; see Plaisance 1, 937 F.2d at 1006 (noting that Buell is recognized
as open invitation for lower courts to explore possibilities of recovery for purely
emotional injuries under FELA).
31. 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gott-
shall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). For a further discussion of the facts of Carlisle, see
infra notes 121-35 and accompanying text. Prior to Carlisle, the Third Circuit con-
fronted the issue of whether emotional injuries are compensable under FELA in
Outten v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991), and Holliday
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1090
(1991). For a discussion of Outten and Holliday, see infra notes 104-14 and accom-
panying text.
32. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 91-92. For a discussion of the procedural history of
Carlisle, see infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
33. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 92.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 92-93.
36. Id. at 92.
37. Id. at 98. The Third Circuit crafted its holding in these terms in order to
emphasize the importance of foreseeability. Id. at 97 (focusing on railroad's ample
notice of stressful working conditions that established pattern of extended expo-
sure to dangerous work-related stress). In addition to reiterating the requirement
that an employee's emotional injuries must be the "reasonably foreseeable" result
of railroad negligence, the Carlisle court also required proof of "extended expo-
sure" to dangerous work-related stress. Id. at 96-97. As such, proof of "extended
exposure" to dangerously stressful working conditions increases the likelihood that
the resulting emotional injuries are "reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 97-98 (con-
cluding that employee's injuries were foreseeable because Conrail had ample op-
portunity to discover hazardous working conditions).
[Vol. 39: p. 197202
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FELA, specifically focusing on the meaning of the statutory term "in-
jury."3 8 Section III of this Note then presents an analysis of the Third
Circuit's decision in .Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp.3 9 Recognizing the
conflicting interests of labor and management with regard to FELA, this
Note asserts in Section IV that the Third Circuit's holding strikes an equi-
table balance between an employee's right to seek recovery for genuine
emotional injuries and an employer's concern over excessive and frivolous
litigation. 40 Section IV also acknowledges the wisdom of the Carlisle
court's, holding, but suggests that more persuasive grounds exist upon
which to support such a holding.4 1 Finally, Section V of this Note exam-
ines the impact the Carlisle decision will have on future FELA litigants and
concludes that the interests of both labor and management will be better
protected as a result of Carlisle.42
II. BACKGROUND
FELA imposes a duty upon railroads to provide their employees with a
safe work environment. 4 3 Specifically, section 51 of FELA permits recov-
ery by employees who suffer injuries as a result of railroad negligence. 4 4 '
38. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (Supp. IV 1992) (allowing recovery in damages for any
"injury" suffered by railroad employees as a result of employer negligence). For a
discussion of the relevant Supreme Court and circuit court decisions regarding
FELA, see infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
39. This Note addresses the reasoning behind the Carlisle court's decision to
allow recovery for emotional injuries resulting from extended exposure to danger-
ous and stressful working conditions. For a discussion of the Carlisle court's hold-
ing and its underlying rationale, see infra notes 136-73 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of how the Carlisle decision constitutes an equitable bal-
ance between the conflicting interests of labor and management with regard to
FELA, see infra notes 174-97 and accompanying text.
41. For an analysis of alternative grounds upon which the Carlisle holding may
be based, see infra notes 198-235 and accompanying text.
42. For a discussion of Carlisle's impact on FELA jurisprudence, see infra
notes 236-46 and accompanying text.
43. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 558 (1987); Car-
lisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Con-
solidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). The duty to provide a safe
workplace was recognized at common law. See Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S.
350, 352-53 (1943) (acknowledging that common law has held employers responsi-
ble for employee safety). With the passage of FELA, such a common law duty
became a statutory duty enforced by federal law. Buel1 480 U.S. at 558.
44. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (Supp. IV 1992). Section 51 of FELA provides in pertinent
part:
Every common carrier by. railroad while engaging in commerce ... shall
be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed
by such [railroad] ... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such
[railroad].
Id. (emphasis added). In 1910, Congress amended FELA to allow concurrent state
and federal jurisdiction Over FELA cases. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 19, at
4. The amendment also extended the venue provisions of FELA to permit a plain-
19941 NOTE
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The United States Supreme Court has established that the term "injury" in
section 51 applies to any physical injury a railroad employee sustains as a
result of a railroad's negligence.45 The question remains, however, as to
whether the term "injury" encompasses purely emotional injuries.4 6 A con-
flict has developed as federal courts have attempted to reconcile the broad
remedial purpose of FELA 47 with the common law standards imposed by
the courts.48
A. Supreme Court Shapes Scope of FELA
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended FELA to
be a broad remedial statute that should be liberally construed by federal
tiff to bring a cause of action in any jurisdiction where: 1) defendant conducts
business, 2) defendant resides or 3) injury took place. Id. For a discussion of
other amendments to FELA, see supra note 21.
45. See, e.g., Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 108-09 (1963)
(holding railroad liable under FELA for bug bite sustained by employee that re-
sulted in amputation of employee's legs); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S.
500, 502-03 (1957) (permitting recovery under FELA for physical injuries suffered
when worker fell from railroad embankment); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,
196 (1949) (holding that silicosis is compensable injury under FELA); Jamison v.
Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 641 (1930) (finding physical injuries caused by assault
compensable under FELA).
46. Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 1990)
(noting that Buell "did not resolve the question of whether the term 'injury' within
the FELA included emotional injuries"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1090 (1991); Stoklosa
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 864 F.2d 425, 426 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The question of
whether a cause of action for purely emotional injury exists under FELA is not
settled."). For other examples of cases in which circuit courts have considered the
possibility of recovery under FELA for purely emotional injuries, see supra note 26.
47. See Urie, 337 U.S. at 181-82 (concluding that language of FELA should-be
broadly construed). FELA's broad remedial purpose was made clear by the
Supreme Court in Urie. Id. For a discussion of Urie, see infra notes 51-54 and ac-
companying text. The Buell Court, however, was hesitant to liberally construe
FELA with regard to purely emotional injuries. See Buel4 480 U.S. at 570 (conclud-
ing that "broad pronouncements" regarding compensability of emotional injuries
may have to give way to precise application of developing legal principles).
48. Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd
sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). Tradition-
ally, states have sought to limit recovery for the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress by creating objective standards for testing the genuineness of the
alleged emotional injury. See Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls:, Toward Full Tort Recovery
for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 333, 336-40 (1984) (discussing common law
rules adopted by courts to restrict recovery for psychic injuries); Julie A. Davies,
Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 5-7
(1992) (noting that for policy reasons state courts require limitations to be placed
upon claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Douglas B. Marlowe,
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Lim-
itation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of
Distress, 33 VILL. L. REv. 781, 782-817 (1988) (reviewing evolution of limitations
imposed upon tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress and underlying
policy bases for such limitations). For a discussion of the four basic common law
standards that courts have adopted, see infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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courts. 49 Consequently, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
term "injury" in FELA was intended by Congress to be an all-inclusive
term.50 In Urie v. Thompson,5 1 the Court held that a railroad fireman who
contracted silicosis 52 as a result of work-related activities had suffered an
"injury" within the scope of FELA.53 Recognizing that the language of
FELA was "as broad as could be framed," the Court construed the plain
language of FELA as making compensable "every injury suffered by any
employee while employed by reason of the carrier's negligence."5 4
In addition to acknowledging FELA's broad remedial purpose, the
Supreme Court has also recognized the dynamic nature of FELA. For ex-
ample, in Kernan- v. American Dredging Co.,5 5 the Court discussed whether
49. Bue, 480 U.S. at 561-62; see Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506 (finding that FELA
cases should go to jury if evidence justifies conclusion that "enployer [sic] negli-
gence played any part, even the slightest," in producing employee's injury); Jami-
son, 281 U.S. at 640-41 (noting that in spirit of broad construction, courts have
construed FELA to cover some intentional torts even though FELA is a negligence
statute).
50. -BueU, 480 U.S. at 561-62 (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180
(1949)). For a general review of Supreme Court precedent with regard to FELA's
liberal construction, see supra note 45.
51. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
52. Id. at 166-67. Silicosis is a pulmonary disease that is medically defined as
.a form of pneumoconiosis resulting from occupational exposure to an inhalation
of silica dust over a period of years." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DicrIoNARY 1422 (25th
ed. 1990). Silicosis is "characterized by a slowly progressive fibrosis of the lungs,
which may result in impairment of [the] lung[s]." Id.
53. Urie 337 U.S. at 180-81. As a fireman, the plaintiff worked on steam loco-
motives for over thirty years. Id. at 165. The jury found that the silicosis was
caused by the plaintiff's continuous inhalation of silica dust blown from the train's
steam engine. Id. at 166. At issue before the Supreme Court in Urie was whether
FELA should be limited to accidental injuries or extended to injuries in the nature
of occupational disease, such as silicosis. Id. at 180-81. In extending FELA's cover-
age to occupational disease, the Uiie Court observed that to "read into this all-
inclusive wording a restriction as to'.. . the particular sorts of harms inflicted,
would be contradictory to the wording [as well as] the remedial and humanitarian
purpose (of FELA]." Id. at 181-82.
54. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).' The Urie Court observed that a liberal con-
struction of FELA was consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 182 n.20
(citingJamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930)).
55. 355 U.S. 426 (1958). In Kernan, a seaman died when an open-flame ker-
osene lamp on the ship's deck ignited highly inflammable vapors of petroleum
-and engulfed him in flames. Id. at 427. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the seaman's death was caused by the
employer's failure to comply with a United States Coast Guard navigational regula-
tion., Id. at 427-28. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the regulation
was not intended to protect seamen from petroleum explosions and, therefore,
was inappropriate as a standard of care in the FELA case. Id. at 428-29. Following
an appeal by the plaintiff, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in
favor of the defendant tugboat owner. Id. at 427.
Recognizing that the plaintiff brought his claim under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1952), the Supreme Court examined the protections afforded
seamen under the Act. Kernan,.355 U.S. at 429. The Kernan Court interpreted the
Jones Act as creating a federal right of action similar to FELA. Id. Acknowledging
9
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common law tort principles restricted the remedies afforded by FELA.56
Rejecting such limitations, the Kernan Court concluded that Congress did
not intend to create a "static remedy, but one which would be developed and
enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry's
duty toward its workers."
57
that the Jones Act provides protection against employer negligence, the Court fur-
ther noted that the Jones Act incorporates all provisions of FELA. See id. at 430-31
(noting thatJones Act provides same cause of action as that provided by FELA); see
also Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., 2 F.3d 480, 482 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that Jones
Act incorporated by reference all provisions of FELA). Because the Jones Act im-
plicates the provisions of FELA, the Kernan Court concluded that FELA jurispru-
dence was applicable to Jones Act cases. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 429 n.3; see Puthe, 2
F.3d at 482 (recognizing that Jones Act claim is guided by law developed under
FELA and Jones Act); Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F.2d 1004, 1006 (5th Cir.
1991) (applying Supreme Court precedent in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987), to Jones Act case), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604 (1992).
Since the Kernan decision, federal courts have viewed decisions in Jones Act cases
as setting precedent with respect to FELA. See, e.g., Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 364 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering Jones Act case as part of
evolving FELA jurisprudence), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994); Visconti v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp., 801 F. Supp. 1200, 1209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Smolsky v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (same). As a result,
federal courts have applied Jones Act rulings such as Kernan in developing FELA
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir.
1993) (applying precedent'of Kernan to FELA case) rev'd sub nom., Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994); Gottshall 988 F.2d at 368 (same).
56. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 432. The Supreme Court was confronted with the
issue of whether, contrary to common law tort doctrines, proof. of the violation
imposed FELA liability on the employer. Id. at 428. Under general tort law princi-
ples, a statute or governmental regulation may be adopted by a court as the rele-
vant standard of care to which the defendant is held, provided that: 1) the
plaintiff is within the class of people the statute or regulation sought to protect and
2) the injury suffered is the type of injury the statute sought to prevent. See id. at
432 n.7 (citing Restatement of Torts § 286 cmt. c). The Kernan Court held that
such proof was sufficient to establish the employer's liability under FELA. Id. at
432.
The Court recognized that liability would not be limited solely to common law
tort doctrines regarding the adoption of statutory or regulatory duties as standards
of care in FELA cases. Id. Rather, the Court acknowledged that FELA liability
shall be imposed upon employers when their conduct "falls short of the high stan-
dard required of [them] by [FELA]" (i.e. duty to provide safe work environment)
and results in injury. Id. at 438-39. The Court concluded that such an approach in
FELA cases was consistent with "congressional intent.., to provide liberal recovery
for injured workers." Id. at 432 (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500,
508-10 (1957)).
57. Id. at 432 (emphasis added). The Court recognized that Congress in-
tended FELA to be merely "a framework within which the courts were left to evolve
... a system of principles providing compensation for injuries to employees." Id. at
437. Such a system was to develop over the course of time and be responsive to the
changing realities of employment in the railroad industry. Id. For a discussion of
the impact of the Kernan decision on the current state of affairs in the railroad
industry, see infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text.
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While the Supreme Court has made it clear that all physical injuries
are compensable under FELA,58 the Court has not explicitly stated that
purely emotional injuries are compensable.59 The Court confronted the
issue of whether purely emotional injuries were cognizable under FELA in
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. BuelL60 In Buel4 a railroad carman
allegedly suffered an emotional breakdown as a result of unwarranted har-
assment by his supervisor and co-workers. 6 1 Choosing to avoid the issue,
the Court refused to decide whether the carman's allegations of negligent
infliction of emotional distress were within the scope of FELA.62 In so
doing, the Court expressed an unwillingness to set forth "broad pro-
nouncements" with regard to whether purely emotional injuries were cog-
nizable under FELA.63 Instead, the' Buell Court directed federal courts to
58. For a list of Supreme Court cases that have permitted recovery under
FELA for a wide array of physical injuries, see supra note 45.
59. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 570 (1987)
(concluding that question of whether emotional injuries are cognizable under
FELA is not " 'yes' or 'no' answer").
60. Id. at 568-70.
61. Id. at 559. The carman brought suit under FELA in federal district court
alleging, inter alia, that Conrail breached its duty to provide him with a safe place
to work by allowing co-workers to threaten and harass him. Id. Most of the alleged
incidents involved the carman's immediate supervisor. Id. at 559 n.1. The supervi-
sor allegedly insisted that the carman improperly complete certain car inspection
reports and steal company property from the train yard. Id. The carman also al-
leged that the supervisor repeatedly threatened to fire him and condoned conduct
by co-workers designed to humiliate the carman. Id. Following discovery, Conrail
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Railway Labor Act precluded sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under FELA. Id. at 560. The district court granted Con-
rail's motion and the carman appealed. Id.
Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the carman's emotional break-
down was cognizable under FELA. Buell v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 771
F.2d 1320, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1985). In so holding, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that FELA "encompasses all reasonably foreseeable injuries which result from a
railroad's failure to exercise due care with respect to its employees." Id. at 1322.
62. Buell 480 U.S. at 570. The Court refused to address the issue because it
found the record insufficient to determine whether the carman's purely emotional
injury, namely his emotional breakdown, was compensable under FELA. Id. at
567-68. Furthermore, the Supreme Court observed that given the posture of the
case, there was no reason for the Ninth Circuit to have addressed the issue. Id.
63. Id. at 570. The Supreme Court was referring to its previous decision in
Urie, whereby the Court held that "every injury suffered ... by reason of the car-
rier's negligence was made compensable [under FELA]." Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 181 (1949). In the appeal of Buellto the Ninth Circuit, the circuit court
relied heavily upon the Urie decision to support its conclusion that all foreseeable
emotional injuries are compensable under FELA. Buel 771 F.2d at 1322. In light
of the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Urie, it is evident that the Supreme Court was
hesitant to extend the broad pronouncements of Urie to claims brought under
FELA for emotional injuries. See Buell 480 U.S. at 570 (noting that question of
whether one can recover for emotional injuries may not be susceptible to all-inclu-
sive "yes" or "no" answer). For a discussion of Buel/s impact on the Supreme
Court's holding in Urie, see infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. Addition-
ally, for a discussion of Urie, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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examine the facts of each case in light of developing common law princi-
ples regarding emotional injury torts.64 Consequently, the Buell Court re-
fused to establish any bright line rule with regard to emotional injuries
under FELA.65
B. Circuit Split Regarding Issue of Emotional Injuries
Given the Supreme Court's refusal in Buell to articulate a rule of law
concerning the compensability of emotional distress claims brought under
FELA, pre-Buell decisions continue to shape the debate, among the circuits
on the issue.66 Specifically, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have created
64. Buell, 480 U.S. at 568. The Buell Court observed that "FELAjurisprudence
gleans guidance from common-law developments." Id. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the determination 'of whether emotional injuries are compensable
under FELA must be based upon the "precise application of developing legal prin-
ciples to the particular facts at hand." Id. at 570.
At-common law, tort actions for physical injuries were based solely upon estab-
lishing the four negligence elements of duty, breach, causation and damage. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1977) (listing elements of cause of action
for negligence). Consequently, there was little disagreement as to what legal prin-
ciples should be applied to determine whether a particular physical injury was
compensable under FELA. The same could not be said for tort actions involving
purely emotional injuries. Tort principles for intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress were less developed by courts and were the subject of tremen-
dous conflict among the states. Marlowe, supra note 48, at 781 (citing W.E.
Shipley, Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or its Physical Conse-
quences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103
(1959)).
The conflict revolved around establishing some objective indicia of genuine-
ness regarding the injury alleged by the plaintiff. Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). Unlike physical injuries, which are observable
and verifiable, emotional injuries have an intangible quality that makes them more
difficult to substantiate. Edward A. McCarthy, Illinois Law in Distress: The "Zone of
Danger" and "Physical Injuiy" Rules in EmotionalDistress Litigation, 19 J.'MARSHA.L L.
REv. 17, 17-18 (1985); see Mark A. Beede, A Survey of Mental Distress Standards, 33
ME. L. REv. 303, 306 (1981) (noting that courts are suspicious of claims for emo-
tional injuries because they are difficult to verify). As a result, state courts have
imposed additional requirements on plaintiffs asserting claims for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. McCarthy, supra, at 22. These requirements, which in-
clude the physical impact rule, zone of danger requirement and bystander
recovery standard, were intended to make claims for emotional injuries more ob-
jectively verifiable. Id. at 22-27; see Davies, supra note 48, at 3-4 (noting that court
"hostility" concerning negligent infliction of emotional distress has lead to addi-
tional proof requirements for tort). For a discussion of the four common law Stan-
dards that have been adopted regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress,
see infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
65. Buel, 480 U.S. at 570. The Buell Court noted that most state courts have
abandoned the physical impact requirement for the common law tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 569 n.20. In addition, the Court observed
that some state courts will allow recovery for emotional injuries upon a mere show-
ing of accompanying physical symptoms. Id. at 570 n.21.
66. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 1985)
(requiring proof of physical contact or threat of physical contact for emotional
distress claims brought under FELA), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987); Buell v.
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different standards for limiting the scope of recovery for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress: 1) the "physical impact" standard67 and 2) the
"full recovery" standard. 68 Under the physical impact standard, which se-
verely limits the scope of the negligent infliction of emotional distress tort,
a plaintiff may recover only for emotional injuries that are incidental to
physical contact.6 9 In contrast, under the full recovery standard, a plain-
tiff may recover damages for emotional distress merely by establishing the
traditional negligence elements of duty, breach, causation and damage. 70
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has used
the physical impact approach in cases decided both before and after Bu-
elL7 1 In Lancaster v. Norfolk and Western Railway,7 2 a pre-Buell decision, the
Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs alleging emotional distress must prove
that their emotional injuries resulted from either "physical contact or [a]
threat of physical contact.173 The Lancaster court reasoned that FELA was
designed to encompass only those claims involving "physical" torts.7 4 Af-
ter Buell the Seventh Circuit re-affirmed its Lancaster decision in Ray v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.7 5 Accordingly, plaintiffs in'the Seventh Circuit nust
establish physical impact or a threat of physical impact in order to recover
damages under FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress.7 6
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 771 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985) (adopting
full recovery method for emotional distress claims brought under FELA), aff'd on
other grounds, 480 U.S. 557 (1987). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in Bue, see iupra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
67. See Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 813 (stating that emotional injuries are compen-
sable under FELA only if caused by "physical contact or threat of physical con-
tact"). For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's physical impact standard, see infra
notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
68. See Buell, 771 F.2d at 1322 (adopting full recovery standard for emotional
injury, claims brought by railroad employees under FELA). For a discussion of the
Ninth Circuit's approach, see infra notes 77-81.
69. See Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1993)
(defining standard as permitting recovery when emotional injury is incidental to
physical impact), rev'd sub nora. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct.
2396 (1994). For a discussion of the physical impact test, see infra note 141 and
accompanying text.
70. See Bell, supra note 48, at 335 (noting that full recovery approach permits
recovery for psychic injury caused by defendant's negligence under same circum-
stances in which recovery for physical injury is permitted). For a complete discus-
sion of the full recovery approach, see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of case law in the Seventh Circuit with regard to the com-
pensability of emotional distress under FELA, see infra notes 72-76 and accompa-
nying text.
72. 773 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987).
73. Id. at 813. For a discussion of the physical impact requirement as devel-
oped in the common.law, see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
74. Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 815. The Lancaster court defined the category of
physical torts as including: "assault, battery, and negligent infliction of personal
injury." Id.
75. 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 914 (1992).
76. Id. at 705. Noting that the Supreme Court in Buell declined to address the
issue of whether emotional injuries are compensable under FELA, the Seventh
1994] I NOTE 209
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In contrast to the approach of the Seventh Circuit, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken a progressive view of the
cognizability of FELA claims for purely emotional injuries.77 In Buell v.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway,78 which was later affirmed on other
grounds by the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit adopted the "full recov-
ery" standard. 79 The "full recovery" standard permits railroad employees
to recover for emotional injuries upon a mere showing of the four tradi-
tional negligence elements.80 The Ninth Circuit based its holding in Buell
upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Urie that "an 'injury' need not be
inflicted by 'external, violent or accidental' means."8 1
Circuit concluded that Lancaster,.a pre-Buell holding, was not compromised by Bu-
ell Id. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit in Ray maintained that Lancaster and its
progeny would remain the law of the circuit. Id. at 705; see Gillman v. Burlington
N. R.R., 878 F.2d 1020, 1023 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Lancaster as basis for con-
clusion that claims for emotional distress brought under FELA require proof of
physical contact or threat of physical contact); Hammond v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
848 F.2d 95, 96 (7th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032 (1989). For a
discussion of the physical impact requirement and its abandonment by most state
courts, see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
77. See Buell v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 771 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir.
1985) (permitting "full recovery" on FELA claims for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress), aff'd on other grounds, 480 U.S. 557 (1987). For a discussion of the
Ninth Circuit's adoption of the "full recovery" method, see infra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text.
78. 771 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
79. Id. at 1322. Under the "full recovery" method, a plaintiff would be permit-
ted to recover for psychic injury proximately caused by the defendant's negligence
under the same conditions as would be necessary to recover for physical injury.
Bell, supra note 48, at 335. It is well-settled at common law that a plaintiff must
establish the tort elements of duty, breach, causation and damage in order to re-
cover in negligence for physical injuries. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 281 (1977) (listing elements of cause of action for negligence). Consequently,
the full recovery method permits recovery for emotional injuries upon a showing
of the four traditional tort elements. See Bell, supra note 48, at 335 n.8 (noting that
plaintiffs could recover for emotional distress that was foreseeable result of defend-
ant's conduct).
80. See Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir.) (noting that full
recovery method allows recovery where "reasonable person, normally constituted,
would not be able to cope adequately with the mental distress occasioned by the
circumstances"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604 (1992); Bell, supra note 48, at 335 n.8
(defining full recovery as requiring plaintiff to allege psychic injuries that were
foreseeable result of defendant's negligence).
81. Buell, 771 F.2d at 1322 (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 186
(1949)). For a discussion of the factual background of Buell, see supra notes 61-62
and accompanying text.
Applying Utie to the facts of Buel, the Ninth Circuit cited as persuasive author-
ity two cases that also applied Urie to similar factual scenarios. Id. at 1322-23 (citing
Randall v. Reading Co., 344 F. Supp. 879, 881-82 (M.D. Pa. 1972) and McMillan v.
Western Pac. R.R., 357 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1960)). First, in McMillan v. Western Pacific
Railroad, the California Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a train dis-
patcher could recover under FELA for emotional injuries that were the result of
highly stressful working conditions. 357 P.2d 449, 449 (Cal. 1960). Relying on
Uie, the California Supreme Court expressly recognized that mental injuries were
compensable under FELA. Id. at 451. The McMillan court noted that "injury" as
210 [Vol. 39: p. 197
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C. Other Circuits Indecisive as to Emotional Injuries
While some circuit courts have viewed the Supreme Court's decision
in Buell as an open invitation to explore the possibility of whether purely
emotional injuries are cognizable under FELA,82 few of them have shown
a willingness to set forth a general rule of law.83 For example, although
prior to Buell the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit spe-
cifically required a showing of physical impact before emotional injuries
could be recovered. 84 Following the Buell decision, the First Circuit has
used in FE[A "is not qualified by 'accidental' or 'bodily' or any other modifying
word or words." Id. at 450. Second, in Randall v. Reading Co., a railroad employee
brought an action under FELA alleging that the railroad negligently failed to pro-
vide prompt medical treatment for a heart attack suffered by the employee. 344 F.
Supp. 879, 881 (M.D. Pa. 1972). In finding such a claim to be compensable under
FELA, the district court concluded that an employee need not suffer "bodily in-
jury." Id. at 882.
After Randa1 two other district courts have permitted recovery for heart at-
tacks suffered as a result of job-related stress. See, e.g., Welby v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that employee who suf-
fered heart attack because of, inter alia, excessive workload stated valid claim under
FELA); Barker v. Consolidated Rail Corp., No. CIV.A.85-5304, 1986 WL 1203, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 1986) (permitting employee to bring claim under FELA for heart
attack suffered as result of job-stress).
82. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1993)
(observing that as a result of Buel4 "federal courts are left to develop the degree to
which negligent infliction of emotional distress is actionable under FELA"), revd,
114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994); Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F.2d 1004, 1006 (5th Cir.
1991) (noting that federal courts view Buell "as an open invitation to the lower
federal courts to explore the possibility of recovery under the FELA for a purely
emotional injury"), modified, 966 F.2d 166 (1992); see Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co.,
2 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 1993) (interpreting Buell decision as likely permitting
recovery under FELA for emotional injuries); Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R., 823 F.2d
693, 694 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that Buell opinion left door to recovery for
emotional injuries slightly open).
83. For a discussion of the ways in which various circuit courts have refused to
address the issue of emotional injuries under FELA, see infra notes 84-101 and
accompanying text. For example, although the First and Fifth Circuits have not
foreclosed the possibility of allowing some recovery for purely emotional injuries,
both circuits appear to favor the "physical impact" test for emotional injuries. See
Plaisance II, 966 F.2d at 169 (noting that bystander recovery standard should be
rejected because injuries related to such recovery do not result from physical
trauma); Moody, 823 F.2d at 694 (noting that although Buell throws doubt on physi-
cal impact requirement, it does not completely open door to recovery for emo-
tional injuries). But see Robert v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 832 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir.
1987) (acknowledging that employee could have claim under FELA if railroad,
knowing of employee's heart condition, acted negligently toward him).
84. Bullard v. Central Vt. Ry., 565 F.2d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1977). In Bullard, a
railroad employee was working on a train that was involved in a head-on collision
with another train. Id. at 195-96. The employee escaped serious injury because he
jumped from the train just prior to the collision. Id. at 195. Following the colli-
sion, however, the employee joined the search for injured or dead members of the
train crew. Id. As a result of this experience, the employee was unable to work for
eleven weeks, allegedly because of, inter alia, the mental distress suffered as a result
of his involvement in the train wreck. Id. at 196. The Bullard court concluded that
the jury's award was excessive because the employee received damages for mental
15
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acknowledged that it is unclear whether a plaintiff must prove a physical
impact in order to recover for emotional injuries.8 5 As such, the First Cit-
cuit has commented that the Buell decision "throws doubt" on the strict
requirement of physical impact.8 6
Since the Buell decision, the United States Court of Appeals for' the
Fifth Circuit, in addition to the First Circuit, has shifted its approach con-
cerning the issue of emotional injuries under FELA.8 7 Having overturned
a previous decision that established the full recovery standard, the Fifth
Circuit, unlike the First Circuit, now appears to favor the physical impact
standard.88 In Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc.8 9 (hereinafter Plaisance I1), the Fifth
Circuit rejected the full recovery standard, which it had earlier adopted in
Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc.90 (hereinafter Plaisance 1). Recognizing that the
distress unrelated to a physical injury or threat of physical impact. See id. at 197(noting that jury could properly award plaintiff damages for fright experiencedjust before and after trains collided, but not for sadness experienced by employee
regarding death of crew members). In reaching this conclusion, the court found
that most common law jurisdictions allowed recovery for mental distress only when
it resulted from a physical injury. Id. at 197 n.3 (citing 2 F. Harper & F. James, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1031-32 & n.4 (1956)). For a discussion of the jurisdic-
tions that have in fact abandoned the physical impact requirement, see infra note
141 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the physical manifestation and
severe emotional distress requirements that replaced the physical impact rule, see
infra note 143..
85. Moody, 823 F.2d at 694.
86. Id. In Moody, an employee alleged that he was regularly denied admission
into an engineer training program, assigned to unattractive locations and denied
access to employment on certain train routes. Id. at 693. The employee claimed
that as a result of such harassment, he suffered fatigue, depression and attacks of
angina. Id. Consequently, the First Circuit was confronted with the issue of
whether the employee's emotional distress was compensable under FELA. Id. at
694. Initially, the Moody court recognized that its previous holding in Bullard was
effectively modified by.Buell Id. The court noted that.Buell "throws doubt" on the
First Circuit's holding in Bullard whereby emotional injuries are compensable
under FELA only upon a showing of physical impact. Id. Concluding that the
employee's injuries were not a foreseeable result of employer negligence, however,
the court found no reason to decide whether emotional injuries are cognizable
under FELA. Id.
87. See Plaisance I 966 F.2d at 169 (rejecting earlier Fifth Circuit holding that
established full recovery method for emotional distress claims brought under
FELA).
88. Id. at 169. For a discussion of the 'Fifth Circuit's apparent change of posi-
tion regarding claims for emotional injuries, see infra notes 89-92 and accompany-
ing text.
89. 966 F.2d 166 (5th C'ir. 1992), modifying 937. F.2d 1004 (1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 604 (1992).
90. 937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1991), modified, 966 F.2d 166 (1992); see Plaisance
II, 966 F.2d at 167-69 (holding that negligently inflicted emotional injuries are
cognizable under FELA).. In Plaisance I, a seaman allegedly suffered emotional
injuries when a small portion of his barge caught fire. Plaisance I, 937 F.2d at 1005.
In analyzing the case law that has developed regarding FELA claims for emotional
injuries, the court found that purely emotional injuries are cognizable under
FELA. Id. at 1008-09. Despite this finding, however, the Plaisance Icourt dismissed
the seaman's appeal on the grounds that his emotional injuries were not a foresee-
16
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appeal should have been dismissed on other grounds, the Plaisance H
court concluded that the panel in Plaisance I improperly addressed the
issue of whether purely emotional injuries are compensable under
FELA,9 1 While the Fifth Circuit refused to foreclose the possibility of fu-
ture'recovery for purely emotional injuries, it did emphasize that, under
most circumstances, purely emotional injuries are recoverable only when
accompanied by physical impact or the threat of physical impact. 92
Some circuit courts have avoided the issue of whether emotional dis-
tress is cognizable under FELA by dismissing such claims on other
grounds.9 3 In Elliot v. Norfolk & Western Railway,94 a railroad employee
brought a FELA claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The employee al-
leged that the railroad unfairly criticized her work and prosecuted unwar-
able result of a minor barge fire. Id. at 1011. Upon rehearing en banc, the Plai-
sance II court affirmed the decision in Plaisance I but modified the Plaisance I
court's conclusion that all emotional injuries are compensable under FELA. Plai-
sance I, 966 F.2d at 167.
91. Plaisance II, 966 F.2d at 168-69. The Plaisance II court concurred with the
Plaisance I decision that the seaman's emotional injuries were not a foreseeable
result of the minor barge fire. Id. The Plaisance H court reasoned that because the
seaman's emotional injuries were not foreseeable" the court in Plaisance I should
not have decided whether purely emotional injuries are cognizable under FELA.
Id. at 169.
92. Id. In modifying Plaisanc I, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that its holding
in Gaston v. Flowers Transportation, 866 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1989), still represents
the law of the circuit regarding emotional distress claims brought under FELA.
Plaisance II, 966 F.2d at 169. In Gaston, the Fifth Circuit refused to adopt the by-
stander recovery standard for emotional distress claims raised under FELA. Gas-
ton, 866 F.2d at 821. The Gaston court viewed the bystander recovery standard as
the first step toward allowing recovery for emotional injuries that did not result
from "physical trauma." Id. at 819. In view of this, the court was unwilling to take
such a step. Id.; see Plaisance II, 966 F.2d at 169 (noting that in rejecting bystander
recovery, Gaston implicitly foreclosed recovery under less exacting common law
standards for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
93. Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding
plaintiff's emotional distress claim to be deficient because plaintiff failed to show
breach of railroad's duty or existence of foreseeable emotional injury). Courts
have also avoided the issue by dismissing such claims on the grounds that the
claims lacked the element of foreseeability. See, e.g., Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co.,
2 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to establish standards for recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress because employee's psychological injuries
were not reasonably foreseeable); Plaisance II, 966 F.2d at'168-69 (concluding that
facts of case do not permit determination of whether purely emotional injuries are
compensable under FELA because employee's injuries were not foreseeable result
of employer's alleged negligence); Stoklosa v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 864 F.2d
425, 426 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding question of whether purely emotional injuries
are compensable under FELA to be moot because plaintiff's emotional distress was
not reasonably foreseeable result of legitimate disciplinary action' taken by
employer).
94. 910 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1990).
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ranted disciplinary charges against her.9 5 Rather than deciding whether a
claim for purely emotional injuries was cognizable under FELA, the
Fourth Circuit dismissed the action on the grounds that the employee
failed to allege "unconscionable abuse or outrageous conduct."
96
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed a
similar approach in Adams v. CSX Transportation, Inc.9 7 In Adams, a rail-
road employee brought a claim against CSX for emotional injuries sus-
tained as a result of harassment by his supervisor.9 8 The Sixth Circuit held
that the employee could not recover for his purely emotional injuries.9 9
The court reasoned that the employee failed to establish "unconscionable
95. Id. at 1225-27. The Elliot court saw little merit in the plaintiff's claim,
labeling her allegations "at best ... a situation of hurt feelings and poor office
relationships." Id. at 1230.
96. Id. at 1229. Seeking to properly apply the precedent of Buell to the facts
of Elliot, the Fourth Circuit examined cases in which other circuits applied Buell to
similar fact patterns. Id. at 1228-29. Ultimately, the Elliot court adopted the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of Buel4 which required allegations of unconscionable
abuse. Id. (citing Netto v. Amtrak, 863 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1989)). Since
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Elliot, some circuits have questioned such an inter-
pretation. In Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., the Second Circuit concluded that the
unconscionable abuse requirement of Buell was only a prerequisite to recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 566 n.13 (1987)). Conse-
quently, the "unconscionable abuse" requirement didnot apply to FELA claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. See id. (noting that "unconscionable
abuse" standard discussed by Buell Court applied solely to claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
97. 899 F.2d 536 (6th Cir.'1990).
98. Id. at 538. The employee suffered a variety of emotional injuries includ-
ing an emotional breakdown and severe depression. Id. After examining the rec-
ord from the trial court, the Sixth Circuit in Adams'concluded that the supervisor
drove the employee to work extremely hard, but not beyond the employee's physi-
cal capabilities. Id. Additionally, the court noted that other outside pressures may
have contributed to the employee's emotional injuries. Id. Specifically, the Adams
court found that the employee was in the midst of an acrimonious divorce and
personal bankruptcy proceedings during the time he was working with his alleg-
edly abusive supervisor. Id.
99. Id. at 539. The Adams court found that the employee had failed to estab-
lish either "a breach of the [railroad's] duty to provide an emotionally safe work-
place or the foreseeability of his emotional injury." Id. With regard to the
employee's failure to establish the foreseeability element, the Adams court con-
cluded that the railroad could not have reasonably foreseen that the employee's
work conditions would cause his emotional injuries. Id. at 540. Specifically, the
court noted that the employee failed to lodge complaints about his supervisor or
his working conditions. Id. The court also observed that the employee "seemed
content" to work under the allegedly abusive supervisor. Id. Because the em-
ployee failed to establish a prima facie case, the court found it unnecessary to
determine whether emotional injuries are cognizable under FELA. Id. at 530.
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abuse" on the part of the employer,100 and therefore, the employee did
not meet the "prerequisite [s] to recovery" for purely emotional injuries. 101
D. Development of Case Law in Third Circuit
Initially, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took
a cautious approach in its examination of whether emotional injuries are
cognizable under FELA.10 2 Rather than adopting a "bright line" rule, the
Third Circuit concluded that emotional injuries under FELA should be
determined on an ad hoc basis.103 In Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
0 4
the Third Circuit denied recovery to a train engineer for emotional inju-
ries sustained as a result of being promoted to a job for which he felt
unqualified. 10 5 The Holiday court based its decision on two grounds.'
0 6
First, the court noted that decisions regarding employment qualifications
and duties are at the heart of labor-management negotiations between the
union and the railroad.10 7 Consequently, the Third Circuit was unwilling
to upset the delicate balance established by the collective bargaining
100. Id. at 540. The Adams court recognized that a railroad does not breach
its duty to provide an emotionally safe workplace unless the railroad engages in
"unconscionable abuse." Id. at 539 (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 567 n.13 (1987)); see Netto v. Amtrak, 863 F.2d 1210, 1214
(5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that unconscionable abuse on part of employer is re-
quired to establish breach of employer's duty to provide emotionally safe work-
place). Consequently, the Adams court concluded that while the supervisor may
have been overbearing, he did not engage in unconscionably abusive conduct. Ad-
ams, 899 F.2d at 540. For a discussion of whether unconscionable abuse is a pre-
requisite to recovery as to claims brought under FELA for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
101. See Adams, 899 F.2d at 539 (interpreting Buell as requiring "unconsciona-
ble abuse" as type of conduct that would amount to breach of employer's duty to
provide emotionally safe workplace).
102. For a discussion of the evolution of case law in the Third Circuit regard-
ing emotional distress claims brought under FELA, see infra notes 103-35 and ac-
companying text.
103. See, e.g., Outten v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74, 79 (3d
Cir. 1991) (refusing to establish "across-the-board" rule for FELA claims based
upon negligent infliction of emotional distress); Holliday v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1990) (adopting case-by-case approach to
emotional distress claims brought under FELA and emphasizing that holding was
limited to facts presented in Holliday), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1090 (1991).
104. 914 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1090 (1991).
105. Id. at 421-22. The train engineer was promoted to conductor and
worked as a conductor. Id. at 422. Claiming that he was not properly trained to
take the position as conductor, the train engineer stated that he frequently "threw
the wrong switches." Id. After seven days as a conductor, the train engineer
claimed that he suffered, inter alia, heart palpitations, sleep disorder, anxiety and
depression. Id.
106. Id. at 424. For a discussion regarding the basis for the court's decision,
see infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
107. Holiday, 914 F.2d at 424. The Holliday court found that the promotion
of the train engineer to the position of conductor was a normal management deci-
sion. Id. at 425.
' NOTE1994]
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agreement, absent a more compelling injury to the employee.10 8 Second,
the Holliday court recognized that recovery for purely emotional injuries
must be strictly limited to avoid the potential for fraudulent or frivolous
litigation.' 0 9 The Third Circuit reasoned that, if unchecked, employees
could bring claims for emotional injuries as a result of ordinary, daily 'Job-
related stress." 110
The Third Circuit subsequently took a similar approach in Outten v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp.,"' once again limiting its holding to the
facts of the case.! 12 In Outten, the Third Circuit refused to permit recovery
for emotional injuries resulting from a railroad employee's reaction to a
108. Id. at 424. The court feared that if employers were held liable for ordi-
nary management decisions, "the most attenuated claims could be advanced." Id.
at 427. The Holliday court cited several reasons for its conclusion that the circum-
stances were not sufficiently compelling to justify an intrusion into the labor-man-
agement relationship. Id. at 425-26. First, the conductor's position was, in some
respects, similar to that of his previous position as a brakeman. Id. at 425. Second,
the train engineer's exposure to the allegedly stressful working conditions lasted
less than a week. Id. Finally, the train engineer suffered no physical injuries. Id. at
426; see Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying
recovery for FELA claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because it
involved "too much- not too dangerous- work"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987).
109. Holliday, 914 F.2d at 424 (citing Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d
807, 813 (7th Cir. 1985)).
110: Id. (quoting Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1073, 1090
(E.D. Pa. 1989), appeal dismissed, 899 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1990)). The Holliday court
adopted the analysis of the district court in Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp. Id. In
Kraus, a train dispatcher alleged that he suffered emotional injuries as a result of
highly stressful working conditions. Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F. Supp.
1073, 1075-76 (E.D. Pa. 1989), appeal dismissed, 899 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1990). The
dispatcher claimed that his employer breached its duty to provide a safe workplace
by forcing him to withstand a heavy workload and chaotic working conditions. Id.
In holding that the dispatcher's emotional injuries were not compensable under
FELA, the Kraus court concluded that "U]ob-related stress is simply not the type of
problem intended to be dealt with by the FELA." Id. at 1090. Essentially, the Kraus
court viewed job-related stress as merely a normal part of the employment experi-
ence. See id. (noting that people in all walks of life face stressful work conditions
on daily basis). The court maintained that if such claims were cognizable under
FELA, then any employee could potentially assert a claim for job-related stress. See
id. (observing that Congress did not intend to single out railroad workers as worthy
of special protection from job-related stress). The Kraus court was unwilling to
extend the scope of FELA to job-related stress because it feared: "(1) incalculable
and potentially unlimited damages, (2) a flood of litigation brought by dis-
enchanted workers, and (3) fraud." Id.
The Third Circuit, in Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., has since repudiated
the Kraus holding that job-related stress is not compensable under FELA. See 990
F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting Kraus court's conclusion that job-related
stress is not type of problem intended to be dealt with by FELA), rev'd sub nom.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). For a discussion of
the Carlisle court's rationale for rejecting Kraus, see infra notes 159-63 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the Holiday court's concern about ordinary job-
related stress claims, see supra notes 108-09.
111. 928 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991).
112. Id. at 79.
216
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train wreck that occurred over a mile away. 113 The Outten court reasoned
that enlarging the scope of FELA to encompass stress-related illnesses
could result in a flood of litigation and potentially unlimited liability for
railroads. 1 1
4
Despite the conservative holdings of Holliday and Outten, the Third
Circuit ultimately decided that emotional injuries are recoverable under
FELA when accompanied by physical manifestations.' 15 In Gottshall v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.,1 16. an employee suffered stress disorder and other
physical ailments as a result of his participation in even ts surrounding the
work-related death of a co-worker.1 17 While recognizing the policy con-
113. Id. at 75. Essentially, the employee was alleging that his knowledge of
the imminent train wreck caused his emotional injuries. Id. Specifically, the em-
ployee knew that two trains were on the same track and were heading toward one
another. Id. The employee claimed that as a result of this knowledge, he feared
that the collision would occur in the' area where he was working and would kill
him. Id. In actuality, the train wreck occurred over a mile away. Id. The em-
ployee neither witnessed the train collision nor was his safety threatened by the
accident. Id. at 76.
The Outten court dismissed the employee's claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress on several grounds. Id. at 78-79. First, the employee was not
within the zone of danger because he was greater than a mile away from the scene
of the train wreck. Id. at 78. Second, the employee failed to meet the necessary
elements for bystander recovery on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress because the employee was not near the scene of the train wreck, nor was
he closely related to injured victims. Id. Finally, the Outten court found that the
employee's emotional injuries were not the foreseeable result of the railroad's al-
leged negligence. Id. at 79. The court concluded that it was hardly foreseeable
that a railroad employee "might suffer serious psychological injuries as a result of
the~fear of injury from a train collision over a mile away." Id.
114. Id., at 79. As in Holliday, the Third Circuit was concerned about the pos-
sibility of creating excessive liability for railroads by allowing employees to bring
attenuated claims under FELA for emotional distress. Id. The Outten court rea-
soned that if the employee in the present case could recover for emotional inju-
ries, then there would be no realistic boundaries imposed on FELA Id.
Consequently, railroads would be liable for every possible distressful event to
which an employee is exposed. Id.
115. See Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that emotional injuries are compensable in certain circumstances when
accompanied by physical manifestations), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). The Gott-
shall holding was essentially limited to the facts of the case:
[I]t is important that we spell out what we are not holding. We are not
holding that a railroad breaches a duty of care when it works its men in
hot weather. We are not holding that an employer must refrain from
pushing its men to do hard labor. We are not holding that every em-
ployee who suffers emotional injuries as a result of the railway, employer's
conduct has a valid FELA claim .... We [are] simply hold [ing] that consid-
ering the totality of these extreme facts in the light most favorable to Gott-
shall... [his] claim has sufficient indicia of genuineness.
Id. at 382-83.
116. 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
117. Id. at 358-60. The plaintiff-employee and his deceased co-worker were
members of a work gang that frequently repaired sections of track in remote loca-
tions. Id. at 358. On the day at issue, the crew was allegedly forced to work in
extremely hot and humid conditions, despite the strenuous nature of the repair
1994]. NOTE
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cerns articulated in Holliday and Outten,1 8 the Third Circuit found that
the tort concepts of duty, foreseeability and proximate cause established
more equitable limits on liability for emotional injuries. 119 The Gottshall
court emphasized that federal courts should not shirk the responsibility of
ensuring a remedy for victims of genuine emotional injuries because "[i] t is
work. Id. Most of the men in the crew were not in good physical condition, and
the plaintiff's co-worker was known to have a heart condition. Id.
The plaintiff claimed that the crew chief worked the men unusually hard and
permitted few rest and water breaks. Id. Allegedly as a result of the extreme
weather conditions, the relentless work-pace, the co-worker's heart condition and
the remoteness of the worksite, the co-worker suffered a fatal heart attack. Id. at
358-59. The plaintiff attempted to revive his co-worker as the crew chief futilely
sought medical assistance. Id. Upon confirmation of the co-worker's death, the
crew chief ordered the plaintiff and the rest of the crew to move the body to the
side of the tracks and return to work. Id. at 359. The crew members worked the
next three hours on the track in full view of the corpse. Id. In the days following
his co-worker's death, the plaintiff began to fear that the extreme weather condi-
tions would also kill him. Id.
The plaintiff brought an action under FELA, alleging that his participation in
the events surrounding the death of his friend and co-worker caused him to suffer
major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 360. The district court
dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the alleged emotional injuries
were not compensable under FELA. Id. Construing the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, concluding
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Conrail breached its duty
to provide the plaintiff with a safe workplace. Id. at 382-83. Specifically, the Third
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff's claim presented a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Conrail's negligence was responsible, within the scope of FELA,
for his injuries. Id. The court specifically cited evidence that the plaintiff was
forced to witness and participate in the events surrounding his co-worker's death
as important factors. Id.
118. Id. at 380. The Gottshall court recognized the strong policy reasons for
precluding claims for "every possible distressful happening to which a railroad
worker is exposed." Id. (quoting Outten v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 928
F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1991)). For a discussion of the policy concerns articulated by
the Outten and Holliday courts, see supra notes 109-10 & 114 and accompanying
text.
119. Gottshall 988 F.2d at 379-81. The Gottshall court was not gravely con-
cerned about frivolous claims brought under FELA for trivial emotional distur-
bances or stress from ordinary working conditions. Id. The court reasoned that
potential liability for frivolous claims can be properly limited through the applica-
tion of the traditional elements of tort law. Id. The court concluded that the con-
cepts of duty, foreseeability and proximate cause provide an effective balance
between the interests of the injured party to seek just compensation and the inter-
ests of society to prevent exposure to unlimited liability. Id.
The Gottshall court was careful to limit the scope of its holding in two respects.
First, the Gottshall court emphasized that its holding was limited to the extreme
circumstances of the case and was not to be extended to all claims for emotional
injuries that are the result of employer negligence. Id. at 382. Second, the court
only recognized a cause of action under FELA for emotional injuries that are ac-
companied by physical manifestations, leaving open the issue of whether purely
emotional injuries are compensable under FELA. Id. at 373-74.
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the business of the courts to make precedent where a wrong calls for
redress."120
III. ANALsis OF CARLISLE V CONSOLDA TED R 4L CORP.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., plaintiff Alan Carlisle worked for
Conrail in the train dispatcher's office. 12 1 As a dispatcher, Carlisle was
responsible for controlling railway traffic consisting primarily of trains car-
rying passengers, cargo and hazardous materials. 122 Prior to 1984, Conrail
normally had eleven dispatchers assigned to each work shift.12 3 In 1984,
however, Conrail sharply reduced the size of the shifts to four dispatch-
ers. 124 Consequently, the responsibilities of Carlisle and the other dis-
patchers increased dramatically.1 25  Along with the additional
responsibility, Carlisle came under constant pressure to keep the trains
running on time.' 26 Moreover, Carlisle was repeatedly instructed by Con-
rail to ignore the heightened safety risks precipitated by Conrail's aging
railstock and outdated switching equipment.' 2 7 During this time, Carlisle
worked long and erratic hours and began to experience fatigue, head-
aches, depression and substantial weight-loss1 28 ., Finally, in 1988, Carlisle
suffered a nervous breakdown and was unable to return to his position as a
dispatcher. 129
Carlisle subsequently brought an action against Conrail for negligent
infliction of emotional distress pursuant to FELA. i30 Carlisle alleged that
Conrail "breached its duty to provide a safe workplace by requiring him to
work under unreasonably stressful and dangerous conditions."' 3' Carlisle
further alleged that, as a result of Conrail's negligence, he suffered emo-
tional injuries, including a nervous breakdown.' 3 2
120. Id. at 381 (quoting WiLLIAM PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 54, at 360 (5th ed.
1984)).
121. 990 F.2d 90, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1993), revd sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
122. Id. at 92.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. In support of his claim that he worked long hours, Carlisle testified
that he worked shifts in excess of 12 hours for 15 consecutive days. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 91-92.
131. Id. at 92.
132. Id. The Carlisle court concluded that an emotional breakdown was suffi-
cient to establish physical manifestations of emotional injuries. Id. The court re-
fused to decide, however, whether emotional injuries without physical
manifestations are compensable. Id. at 97 n.11.
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Following a jury trial, Carlisle was awarded $386,500 in damages.' 3 3
Conrail moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds
that Carlisle's emotional injuries were not cognizable under FELA.13 4 The
district court denied the motion and Conrail subsequently appealed to the
Third Circuit.' 3 5
B. Work-Related Stress Claims Cognizable Under ELA
1. -ELA Jurispmdence
The Carlisle court initially examined FELA jurisprudence to deter-
mine whether work-related- emotional distress is compensable under
FELA.13 6 The court recognized that "FELA jurisprudence 'gleans gui-
dance from common law developments.' 1537 Examining the develop-
ment of common law negligence, the court found that the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress did not exist at the time of
FELA's enactment.1 38 The court further noted that although states use
various threshold tests and limitations, all states currently recognize such a
tort.
13 9
The Carlisle court 'observed that most states have adopted one of
four basic common law standards for testing the genuineness of claims
133. Id. at 92.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 93.
136. Id. at 93-95.
137. Id. at 94 (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557,
568 (1987)).
138. Id. Although recovery for mental distress was permitted as "pain and
suffering" damages in connection with an independent tort, courts were slow to
recognize a separate tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Beede, supra
note 64, at 306. Courts traditionally viewed claims for purely emotional injuries
with suspicion, allowing recovery only for intentionally inflicted emotional distress.
McCarthy, supra note 64, at 17. As such, courts required proof of intentional or
"extreme and outrageous" conduct. Id. at 19. In the late 1890s, negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress gained recognition from several American courts as an
independent tort action. Beede, supra note 64, at 306-07 nn.17-20; see, e.g., Haas v.
Metz, 78 Ill. App. 46 (1898); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897).
However, with the exception of these courts, there was little case law regarding the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress when Congress enacted FELA in
1908. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. Initially, courts permitted recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress only upon a showing of a contemporaneous physi-
cal injury. Marlowe, supra note 48, at 783. This approach became known as the
"physical impact" requirement. d. For a discussion of the physical impact rule,
see infra note 141 and accompanying text. As the case law developed, some courts
began to liberalize the recovery standards for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, allowing recovery for emotional injuries suffered'while in the "zone of dan-
ger" or in certain "bystander" situations. McCarthy, supra note 64, at 25-26. For a
discussion of the "zone of danger" and "bystander" approaches, see infra notes 142
& 144.
139. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. For a discussion of the divergent views taken by
the states as to the necessary limitations to be imposed on recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, see infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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for negligent infliction of emotional distress.' 40 These common law
standards are: 1) the physical impact test,14 1  2) the zone of
danger test,142 3) the physical manifestation test 1 43 and 4) the "relative
140. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. Courts developed these common law standards
to artificially limit the potential scope of the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress by preventing fraudulent claims. Id. As such, courts viewed objec-
tive evidence of emotional injury as a way to protect against fraudulent claims. Id.
For example, courts viewed evidence of physical injury as an objective basis for
verifying the existence of emotional injuries. Beede, supra note 64, at 306; Mar-
lowe, supra note 48, at 784.
141. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. The Carlisle court defined the physical impact
rule as allowing recovery only where the plaintiff's em'otional'injuries were inci-
dental to physicalcontact. Id. The court in Carlisle noted that courts at common
law created the physical impact standard in response to perceived concerns about:
1) difficulty of proof; 2) fear of fraudulent claims; 3) flood of litigation; and 4)
potential for unlimited liability. Beede, supra note 64, at 307.
Only the Seventh Circuit explicitly requires the proof of "physical impact" as a
prerequisite to recovery under FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 95. For a discussion of the development of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's case law regarding emotional injury claims brought under FELA, see supra
notes 71-76 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit has also indicated that it
might require some proof of physical impact before allowing recovery for emo-
tional injury claims brought under FELA. Plaisance y. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166,
169 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604 (1992). For a discussion of the recent
developments in the Fifth Circuit's case law, see supra notes 87-92 and accompany-
ing text.
Ironically, most state courts have abandoned the physical impact requirement
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 570 n.2 (1987) (citing state courts that have abandoned physi-
cal impact requirement); see Marlowe, supra note 48, at 792 n.59 (identifying just
five states that use physical impact as primary limitation device for mental distress
actions). For a discussion of why common law developments regarding negligent
infliction of emotional distress are relevant to the issue of whether emotional inju-
ries are compensable under FELA, see supra note 64 and accompanying text. For a
review of jurisdictions that have adopted more liberal standards of recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, see infra notes 143,-228 and accompany-
ing text.
142. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. The Carlisle court noted that the zone of danger
test allows recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the absence of
physical contact when the plaintiff's emotional injuries arise from the threat of
physical harm. Id. The zone of danger test attempts to achieve policy goals similar
to the physical impact standard. Id. For a discussion of the policy goals of the
physical impact standard, see supra note 141. Many jurisdictions have adopted the
zone of danger test in place of the more restrictive physical impact standard. Mar-
lowe, supra note 48, at 794. However, the zone of danger test has been criticized as
denying recovery for deserving plaintiffs. Beede, supra note 64, at 313-14. In par-
ticular, critics of the test have argued that, similar to the physical impact test, the
zone of danger test sets arbitrary limits to recovery. Id. For example, under the
zone of danger test recovery for emotional injuries "does not extend to those indi-
viduals who are foreseeably psychologically affected" by a defendant's 'negligent
conduct. Marlowe, supra note 48, At 794.
143. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. Under the physical manifestation test, recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress is allowed if the emotional injuries are
accompanied by some physical injury. Id. Many courts have allowed recovery in
situations where there was little concern for unlimited liability or fraudulent
claims. Marlowe, supra note 48, at 801. In fact, a review of the common law indi-
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cates that a majority of states permit recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress upon a showing of "physical manifestations." See Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d
668, 669 (Ariz. 1979) (mental anguish is recoverable where, inter alia, shock or
mental anguish is manifested by physical injury); Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d
1163, 1164-65 (Colo. 1978) (finding physical manifestations of emotional- injuries,
including nightmares, sleepwalking, nervousness and irritability, were sufficient to
allow recovery for serious emotional injuries); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d
709, 715 (Del. 1965) (holding that plaintiff could recover for physical injuries re-
sulting from fright proximately caused by defendant's negligence); Gilper v.
Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 302 A.2d 740, 745 (D.C. 1973) (noting that negligently
caused mental disturbance must be traced to substantial physical injury); Cham-
pion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985) (finding that plaintiff states cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when psychic injuries are evi-
denced by significant discernible physical injury); Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein,
Frazer & Murphy, 311 S.E.2d 818, 819 (Ga. 1984) (recognizing that for plaintiff to
recover for negligent infliction of mental distress, plaintiff must prove physical in-
jury); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons N.W., 606 P.2d 944, 954-55 (Idaho 1980) (re-
quiring emotional distress to be accompanied by physical manifestations as
prerequisite to recovery); Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, 357 N.E.2d
247, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976), vacated in part, 369 N.E.2d 947 (1977) (stating gen-
eral rule that mental suffering must be accompanied by physical injury); Hoard v.
Shawnee Mission Medical Ctr., 662 P.2d 1214, 1219-20 (Kan. 1983) (acknowledg-
ing that recovery for emotional distress caused by negligence of defendant not
permitted unless accompanied by physical injury); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437
N.E.2d 171, 174 (Mass. 1982) (holding that plaintiff must prove that emotional
injury was accompanied by physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology
in order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Vance v. Vance,
408 A.2d 728, 730, 734 (Md. 1979) (concluding that plaintiff who suffered emo-
tional collapse, depression and evidenced symptoms of ulcer and insomnia estab-
lished requisite physical manifestations sufficient to allow recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress); Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Mich.
1970) (recognizing that where definite and objective physical injury is produced as
result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant's negligent conduct,
plaintiff may recover in damages for such physical consequences notwithstanding
absence of physical impact); Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 165 N.W.2d 259, 263
(Minn. 1969) (finding that plaintiff who had severe and persistent physical disabil-
ity resulting from fright had right of recovery); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Young, 384
So. 2d 69, 71 (Miss. 1980) (requiring proof of physical injury or genuine physical
consequences before permitting recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress);
Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 304 (N.H. 1979) (noting that emotional harm must
be painful mental experience with lasting effects and that psychic injury must man-
ifest itself by way of physical symptoms); Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (N.J.
1965) (allowing recovery for mental distress manifested by "[s]ubstantial bodily in-
jury or sickness");Jines v. City of Norman, 351 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Okla. 1960) (con-
cluding that there can be no recovery for mental pain and anguish that is not
connected with some physical suffering); Melton v. Allen, 580 P.2d 1019, 1021-22
(Or. 1978) (recognizing that plaintiff must prove physical injury or physical conse-
quences in order to recover on claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress);
Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hosp., 437 A.2d 1236, 1239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (recogniz-
ing that physical impact from negligent source is requisite element to tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress); Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d 894, 895
(R.I. 1988) (acknowledging that physical symptomatology of emotional distress is
necessary for recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Dooley v.
Richland Memorial Hosp., 322 S.E.2d 669, 671 (S.C. 1984) (requiring objective
evidence of physical injury upon which to base claim for emotional injuries);
Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235, 240 (S.D. 1979) (noting well-established rule
that damages for mental anguish cannot be sustained where there is no evidence
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bystander" test.14 4 The court recognized that each of these standards re-
quires "some external indicia" to authenticate the harm suffered.
145
Following its survey of state common law, the Carlisle court examined
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buell.146 The court first
recognized that the Supreme Court declined to decide whether purely
emotional injuries are cognizable under FELA.1 47 The Carlisle court then
surmised that this refusal to decide the issue was due, in part, to the broad
of accompanying physical injury); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d
431, 433-34 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that emotional distress resulting from mistaken
belief that contamination of household water supply would result in physical injury
to plaintiff and family was actionable at common law); Farmers & Merchants State
Bank of Krum v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1981) (recognizing that
damages for mental anguish are recoverable upon showing of accompanying physi-
cal injury); Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973) (holding that emo-
tional distress is recoverable in the absence of physical impact when accompanying
physical injury was result of fright or shock); Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103
(Wash. 1976) (en banc) (requiring "objective symptomatology" of emotional dis-
tress before permitting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress);
Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 437 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Wis. 1989) (noting
that general rule in Wisconsin is to allow recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress where emotional distress is manifested by physical injury); c.f
M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Ark. 1980) (permitting recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress when distress is accompanied by physi-
cal manifestations).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that physical manifestations in-
cluded "long continued nausea or headaches.., and even long continued mental
disturbance, as for example.., repeated hysterical attacks or mental aberrations."
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. c (1965); see Payton, 437 N.E.2d at
175 n.5 (concluding that physical manifestations can be caused by emotional
stress).
144. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. The relative bystander test expands the scope of
liability beyond the immediate zone of danger to encompass those who witness the
physical injury of a closely related family member. See id. (describing relative by-
stander test as requiring that plaintiff witness injury of close relative). The
landmark case of Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), first established the
specific elements for bystander recovery. These elements are: 1) the plaintiff was
near scene of accident, 2) the plaintiff's shock resulted from direct emotional im-
pact caused by sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident and 3)
the plaintiff was closely related to the victim. McCarthy, supra note 64, at 27 (citing
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968). Since the California Supreme
Court's decision in Dillon, several states have adopted the Dillon criteria verbatim
or in a slightly modified form. See Marlowe, supra note 48, at 807 (observing that
nine states have adopted Dillon elements nearly verbatim while six states have ad-
ded "objectively serious injury" requirement to Dillon criteria).
145. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. The Third Circuit in Carlisle concluded that
courts developed the common law standards in response to judicial suspicion as to
the risks of fraud and exaggerated emotional distress claims. Id.
146. Id. at 94-95. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Buell
and its prior holdings in Urie and Kernan, see supra notes 49-65 and accompanying
text.
147. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94 (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell,
480 U.S. 557, 570 (1987)).
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divergence among states regarding the standards of recovery for emo-
tional injury torts.148
The Carlisle court recognized that, as a result of the Buell decision, the
circuit courts have no clear direction as to whether emotional distress
claims are cognizable under FELA. 149 Furthermore, the court noted that
the Supreme Court in Buell directed the circuit courts to apply evolving
common law principles of torts rather than establishing an "all-inclusive"
rule of law as to the compensability of emotional injuries.150 Examining
the conflicting decisions rendered by the circuit courts in the aftermath of
Buell, the Carlisle court concluded that "no common discernable principle"
has developed among the federal ircuits.151
The Carlisle court specifically cited the conflicting positions of the Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits as exemplifying the lack of consensus among the
circuits regarding recovery for emotional injuries. 152 The Carlisle court
noted that the Seventh Circuit requires physical impact to accompany
emotional distress, while the Ninth Circuit allows full recovery for purely
emotional injuries. 153 Ultimately, the Third Circuit in Carlisle character-
ized the differences amongfederal circuits as reflecting an inherent ten-
sion between FELA's mandate for expanding recovery standards and
courts' concerns about excessive or frivolous litigation. 154
148. Id. The Carlisle court also cited the inadequacy of the record in the Buell
case as another reason why the Supreme Court declined to decide whether emo-
tional injuries were compensable under FELA. Id.
149. Id. at 95. For a discussion of the positions taken by various circuits on
the issue of compensability of injuries under FELA, see supra notes 66-101 and
accompanying text.
150. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94. Specifically, the Carlisle court referred to the gui-
dance of the Supreme Court in Buell that "broad pronouncements... may have to
bow to the precise application of developing legal principles to the particular facts
at hand." Id. (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 570
(1987)).
151. Id. at 95 (quoting Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 365
(3d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994)). For a discussion of the conflicting
positions taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, see supra notes 71-81 and ac-
companying text.
152. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 95.
153. Id. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Lancaster and
Ray, see supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. Additionally, for a discussion of
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Buel/ see supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
154. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 95. The Carlisle court noted that Congress did not
intend FELA to be a static remedy, but one which should be developed and en-
larged. Id. (citing Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958)).
The court contrasted this broad mandate of FELA with common law limitations
imposed on the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. The limita-
tions reflect concerns about a flood of baseless litigation resulting from unre-
strained emotional distress claims. Id. at 94-95.
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2. Third Circuit Precedent
The Carlisle court proceeded to examine Third Circuit precedent ad-
dressing recovery for purely emotional injuries under FELA. 155 Citing the
circuit's holdings in Outten and Holliday, the court observed that in both
instances, the circuit's refusal to allow the plaintiff to recover for purely
emotional injuries was limited to the facts of each case 15 6 The Carlisle
court further noted that its recent holding in Gottshall permitted recovery
under FELA for emotional distress without any proof of physical
impact. 15 7
The Carlisle court next considered whether Congress intended FELA
to encompass job-related stress. 158 The court initially focused on the hold-
ing of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kraus v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.'5 9 The district court in Kraus reasoned that job-
related stress was not intended to be within the scope of FELA because
"most state and federal... [courts] required allegations of specific physical
impact."16 0
The Carlisle court rejected the rationale set forth in Kraus and found
that the wording of FELA "was not restrictive as to ... the particular kind
of injury resulting."16 1 The Third Circuit further reasoned that under this
interpretation of FELA, emotional and physical injuries that are the fore-
seeable result of employer negligence are cognizable under FELA. 162 The
Carlisle court made it clear that employer negligence includes circum-
stances in which workers are required to remain in unreasonably danger-
ous and stressful work conditions for significant periods of time.163
155. Id. at 95-96. The Carlisle court noted that indecision existed within the
Third Circuit as to whether FELA permits recovery for claims of emotional distress.
Id.
156. Id. at 96-97. For a discussion of the Holliday and Outten decisions, see
supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
157. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 96. The Gottshall decision represented the first time
that the Third Circuit allowed recovery for emotional injuries without proof of
physical impact. Id. The Gottshall court's holding, however, was limited to emo-
tional injuries manifested by some resulting physical injury. Id. For a discussion of
the Gottshall decision, see supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. Similarly, in
Carlisle, the court found the train dispatcher's emotional injuries to be substanti-
ated by physical manifestations. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97 n. 11. As a result, the Car-
lisle court also refused to decide whether purely emotional injuries are
compensable under FELA. Id.
158. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97.
159. Id. For a discussion of the Kraus holding, see supra note 110.
160. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 96 (quoting Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 1073, 1089-90 (E.D. Pa. 1989), appeal dismissed, 899 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir.
1990)).
• 161. Id., 990 F.2d at 96 (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181
(1949)). For a discussion of the Urie decision, see supra notes 51-54 and accompa-
nying text.
162. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 96.
163. Id.
1994] NOTE'
29
Shields: Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp. and Justice Ginsburg's Dissen
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW
The Carlisle court next emphasized that its decision to permit recovery
under FELA for work-related stress was "not inconsistent" with Third Cir-
cuit precedent. 164 The court noted that the Third Circuit's holding in
Holliday did not contemplate the factual circumstances of "protracted" ex-
posure to "dangerous conditions."1 65 As such, the Carlisle court con-
cluded that Holliday did not apply to the facts of Carlisle.166 Moving next
to the Third Circuit's holding in Outten, the Carlisle court distinguished
Outten as involving injuries that were not the foreseeable result of the em-
ployer's alleged negligence.167 Finally, the Carlisle court cited the Gottshall
decision, which permitted recovery of emotional injuries under certain cir-
cumstances, as a basis for extending the scope of FEIA to claims for work-
related stress. 168
In expanding its interpretation of FE[A to include the facts of Carlisle,
the court highlighted three factors supporting the position that Conrail
had ample notice of the stressful and dangerous conditions imposed on
the plaintiff. 16 9 First, the plaintiff had lodged complaints with Conrail re-
garding the stressful working conditions. 1 70 Second, other train dispatch-
ers had previously suffered a variety of emotional problems., 7 1 Third,
government reports documented the stressful nature of the train dis-
patcher's job by criticizing the outdated equipment and hazardous work-
ing conditions in the dispatcher's office. 1 72 The Carlisle court ultimately
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 426-27
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1090 (1991)).
166. See id. (citing language in Holliday opinion that leaves open question of
whether FELA permits recovery for emotional injuries resulting from exposure by
railroad employee to "dangerous conditions for a protracted time").
167. Id. at 96-97.
168. Id. at 97-98. For a general discussion of Gottshall see supra notes 117-20
and accompanying text.
169. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97. The court was resolute in its efforts to ensure
that railroads are liable only for those employee injuries that are the foreseeable
result of employer negligence. See id. (requiring that emotional injuries are fore-
seeable result of extended exposure to stressful working conditions). In addition
to emphasizing that the emotional injuries must be reasonably foreseeable, the
Carlisle court also required evidence of "extended exposure" to the stressful condi-
tions. Id. The extended exposure requirement provides railroads with a reason-
able opportunity to discover the dangerous and stressful working conditions and
to remedy the situation. See id. (noting that railroad had prior notice of hazardous
working conditions through official governmental reports and prior complaints
from other train dispatchers).
170. Id.
171. Id. The depositions of the plaintiff's fellow workers were introduced
into evidence at trial. Id. These depositions revealed that the co-workers who had
jobs as dispatchers suffered cardiac arrest, nervous breakdowns and depression.
Id.
172. Id. at 93. The reports were prepared by the Federal Railway Administra-
tion, a governmental agency that monitors the railroad industry. Id. at 97. The
Carlisle court also noted that Conrail's railstock was aging and its switching equip-
ment was outdated. Id. at 92.
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concluded from these facts that Conrail had breached its duty to provide
the plaintiff with a safe workplace. 173
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Carlisle Court Strikes Equitable Compromise
In addressing the issue of recovery for emotional injuries under
FELA, the Carlisle court recognized that two competing interests were at
stake.17 4 On the one hand, the court acknowledged the interests of em-
ployees who fall victim to dangerously stressful working conditions and
whose only recourse is to pursue a cause of action under FELA.175 On the
other hand, the court recognized the interests of employers who face po-
tentially unlimited liability for work-related stress claims, which threaten
the financial stability of the railroad industry.1 76 With these considera-
tions in mind, the Carlisle court carefully restricted recovery for work-re-
lated stress to instances in which "it is reasonably foreseeable that extended
exposure to dangerous and stressful working conditions" will cause injury to
a railroad employee.1 77 Consequently, the court's analysis struck an equi-
table balance between the legitimate interests of both labor and manage-
ment concerning FELA.
178
With regard to the interests of labor, the Carlisle holding affords em-
ployees a source of protection from prolonged exposure to dangerously
stressful working conditions.1 79 Employees benefit from such protection
173. Id. at 98.
174. See id. at 95 (recognizing that expansive interpretation of FELA must be
reconciled with fear of unlimited liability for emotional distress claims).
175. See id. at 96 (concluding that emotional injuries that are foreseeable re-
sult of extended exposure to dangerous work-related stress are compensable under
FELA); Phillips, supra note 21, at 50 (recognizing that Congress passed FELA to
provide railroad employees reasonably reliable tort compensation system).
176. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94-95 (noting concern about potential for flood
of litigation and unlimited liability arising from unrestrained emotional distress
claims). The primary interest at stake for the railroad industry is the containment
of liability under FELA. Taylor, supra note 20, at 27; see Outten v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that there must be
realistic boundaries on FELA claims to prevent excessive liability for unlimited
emotional distress claims); Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 423
(3d Cir. 1990) (noting that emotional injury claims under FELA must be limited to
avoid flood of claims by disenchanted workers), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1090 (1991);
Phillips, supra note 21, at 50 (noting railroad industry's fear of burgeoning claims
for occupational disease). For a discussion of the potential liability that could re-
sult from unrestrained work-related stress claims, see infra note 244 and accompa-
nying text.
177. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97 (emphasis added).
178. For a detailed discussion of how the interests of both labor and manage-
ment were protected by the Carlisle holding, see infra notes 182-97 and accompany-
ing text.
179. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97 (holding that employer is liable under FELA
when it is reasonably foreseeable that extended exposure to dangerous and stress-
ful working conditions will cause injury to railroad worker).
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in two ways. First, the victims of serious work-related stress have the oppor-
tunity to seek just compensation under FELA for their emotional inju-
ries. 180 Second, employers who become aware of this potential liability are
likely to establish mechanisms that identify and correct dangerously stress-
ful working conditions.' 8 1
With regard to the interests of management, the Carlisle holding pro-
tects railroad employers from the threat of unlimited liability for injuries
resulting from work-related stress. 18 2 In general,judicial concerns regard-
ing unlimited liability for work-related stress claims brought under FELA
differ significantly from the common law fear of unlimited liability for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress.' 8 3 At common law, the fear of un-
limited liability focuses on the number of "bystanders" who could
potentially assert claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 18 4
Critics of the bystander theory question where the chain of causation
would end. 185 The hypothetical assassination of the President serves as a
poignant example of the potential for unlimited liability: Would the
assassin be held liable to the millions of distressed people around the
world who may have witnessed the event on television?' 8 6
180. Id., see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561(1987) (recognizing that FELA provides railroad workers federal tort remedy for
injuries suffered as result of employer negligence).
181. See Phillips, supra note 21., at 49 (stating that FELA serves as real and
valuable incentive to promote employee safety in railroad industry). In the past,
the Third Circuit has recognized that the issue of general working conditions is
within the exclusive province of labor-management contract negotiations. Hol-
liday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 424 '(3d Cir. 1990); cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1090 (1991). As such, the union regularly monitors the working conditions
structured by management. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355,
384 (3d Cir. 1993) (Roth,J., dissenting) (stating that working rules and conditions
of rail workers' jobs are structured by management and monitored by union),
rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). Because of management-union cooperation on the
issue of working conditions, a compelling reason is necessary to justify the disrup-
tion of the delicate balance of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
A recent study by the Consumer Federation of America concluded that a tort
compensation system, such as the one established.by FELA, provides a strong in-
centive to improve employee safety. See Phillips, supra note 21, at 54 (arguing that
tort compensation system promotes employee safety). Consequently, recognition
of a tort action for extended exposure to dangerously stressful working conditions
would provide an incentive to railroads to identify and correct such working condi-
tions. See id. (noting that railroads took no corrective action in hazardous clean-up
cases until injured workers brought suits against employers under FELA).
182. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 98 (limiting work-related stress to genuine claims
that are foreseeably caused by alleged working conditions).
183. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2418 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that because FELA only covers railroad employ-
ees and not "public at large," the scope of potential plaintiffs is "hardly infinite."
184. Bell, supra note 48, at 363.
185. See id. (referring to argument made by critics regarding concept of full
recovery for bystanders).
186. Id. at 365 n.129.
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However, as Justice Ginsburg acknowledged in her Gottshall II dissent,
bystander recovery is not the type of liability implicated by work-related
stress claims brought under FELA. 187 In the FELA context, liability is lim-
ited to the duty owed by an employer to an employee.18 8 Consequently, a
breach of an employer's duty to provide a safe workplace extends only to
the individual employees affected by the allegedly dangerous working con-
ditions.1 89 The chain of causation begins and ends with the specific em-
ployees allegedly injured by the unsafe working conditions.190
The real threat of excessive employer liability under FELA for. work-
related stress claims, however, arises from the potential number of rail-
road employees who have experienced some form of work-related
stress.19 ' In view of this type of potential FELA liability, the Carlisle court
wisely limited railroad liability under FELA by requiring plaintiffs to prove
extended exposure to dangerous and stressful working conditions. 19 2 This
limitation protects.railroad employers in two ways. First, the requirement
of "extended exposure" prevents employees from seeking recovery for
work-related stress related to isolated incidents. 193 Second, the require-
187. See Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2418 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
"the universe of potential FELA plaintiffs ... is hardly 'infinite'" because FELA
does not govern "the public at large") (quoting term used in majority opinion,
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2409 (1994)).
188. See id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (maintaining that "[o]nly persons 'suffer-
ing injury.., while employed' by a railroad may recover under the FELA" and not
"public at large") (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988)).
189. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Only persons 'suffering injury ...
while employed' by a railroad may recover under the FELA ... ") (quoting 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1988)).
190. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that railroad employee must
show that alleged injury resulted from railroad's negligence).
191. See Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 424 (3d Cir. 1990)
(observing that employees such as railroad workers face stressful working condi-
tions "every working day") (quoting Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F. Supp.
1073 (E.D. Pa. 1989), appeal dismissed, 899 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1990)), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1090 (1991)'
192. Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd
sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). In addition,
the Carlisle court also emphasized that an employee's emotional injuries must be a
"reasonably foreseeable" result of the dangerously stressful working conditions. Id.
Taken together, the specific requirements of the Carlisle decision make it clear that
emotional injuries must be foreseeable by the employer. See id. at 98 (requiring
convincing evidence of foreseeability before recovery permitted for work-related
stress).
193. See Stephanie Ann Schrimpf, Workers' Compensation for Mental Stress Arising
from Personnel Decisions, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 587 (1987) (providing possible sce-
narios in which employees could suffer emotional injuries from isolated incidents
of work-related stress). Moreover, the "extended exposure" requirement provides
employers with a fair opportunity to identify and remedy potentially dangerous
and stressful working conditions. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 98 (implying that because
employee's stressful conditions persisted for long period, Conrail had fair opportu-
nity to discover and correct harmful conditions). Finally, because employees face
many pressures outside of work, the extent to which infrequent episodes of work-
related stress contribute to the resulting emotional injuries remains unclear.
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ment of "dangerous and stressful" working conditions protects employers
from potentially fraudulent claims for work-related stress by establishing a
higher threshold of harm.' 9 4 As such, plaintiffs must prove the existence
of "dangerous and stressful" working conditions, rather than merely alleg-
ing that their emotional injuries were the result of ordinary employment
conditions. 195 By placing restrictions upon plaintiffs seeking recovery for
work-related stress, the Carlisle court appropriately recognized that rail-
road employers are not the insurers of employees' emotional well-be-
ing. 196 Rather, an employer's duty under FELA is limited to protecting
employees from unreasonably harmful working conditions.1 9 7
B. Alternative Legal Grounds for Carlisle Holding
The Carlisle court based its holding that work-related stress is compen-
sable under FELA upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Urie.198 Despite properly summarizing the Urie holding, the Third Circuit
failed to consider the limitations subsequently placed on Urie by the Buell
David P. Gontar, The Noncompensability of Psychologically Induced Mental Disorders in
Louisiana's Worker's Compensation Law, 34 Loy. L. REv. 311, 317 (1988) (observing
that precise cause of nany mental disorders remains unknown, making proof of
medical causation difficult).
194. See Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1019-20
(Me. 1979) (adopting "unusual stress" test for gradual stress claim brought under
state workers compensation system); FredJ. Pompeani, Mental Stress and Ohio Work-
ers Compensation: When is a Stress-Related Condition Compensable?, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
35, 54 (1992) (noting that in adopting "unusual stress" test, court in Townsend
established significantly higher threshold of proof for work-related stress claims
that will serve as appropriate buffer between employer and host of malingering
claims).
195. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97 (requiring proof of "dangerous and stressful
working conditions" as prerequisite to claim brought under FELA for negligent
infliction of emotional distress); see also Pompeani, supra note 194, at 54 (discuss-
ing need for higher threshold of proof with regard to work-related stress claims).
196. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 98 (emphasizing that employee claims for work-
related stress must be genuine and properly allege negligent conduct on part of
employer); see, e.g., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 61 (1949) (stating that
under FELA railroad employers are not insurers of employees' health); Gottshall v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 379 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that FELA
does not require employers to be insurer of employees' safety), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
2396 (1994).
197. See Gottshal4 988 F.2d at 375-76 (noting that creation of unreasonably
dangerous work conditions by railroad constitutes breach of employer's duty owed
to its employees under FELA).
198. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 96 (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181
(1949)). Specifically, the Carlisle court held:
We disagree [that job-related stress is not recoverable under FELA]. The
Supreme Court [in Urie] has held that "[t]he wording [of the FELA] was
not restrictive as to... the particular kind of injury resulting." Under this
explication of the FELA, it is becoming more and more apparent that
emotional and physical injuries that are the foreseeable result of requir-
ing workers to remain in unreasonably dangerous and stressful work con-
ditions for significant periods of time can present a claim under the
statute.
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Court with regard to the issue of emotional injuries. 199 In essence, the
Court in Buell refused to extend the Urie Court's broad construction of the
term "injury" in FELA to negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims.20 0 In so holding, the Buell Court signalled that Urie was an inap-
propriate basis for establishing the cognizability of FELA claims for emo-
tional distress.2 0 1
While the Carlisle court correctly held 'that dangerous work-related
stress is compensable under FELA, the court could have based its holding
on other, more persuasive grounds.2 0 2 First, the court could have adopted
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Kernan, because the rationales un-
derlying both Kernan and Buell are strikingly similar.20 3 Second, in follow-
ing Buelf s guidance, the Carlisle court could have justified its holding as
consistent with common law developments regarding negligent infliction
of emotional distress.20 4
Id. (citation omitted). For a discussion of the facts of the Carlisle case and the
court's analysis, see supra notes 121-73 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the Court's holding in Urie and the basis for its decision, see supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text.
199. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 96. The Carlisle court properly observed that the
Supreme Court in Urie expansively defined the term "injury" as "all inclusive." Id.
200. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 570 (1987).
Contrary to the Urie Court's holding that the term "injury" was "all-inclusive," the
Buell Court held that "broad pronouncements in this area may have to bow to the
precise application of developing legal principles." Id. In Urie, the Supreme Court
clearly established broad pronouncements with regard to the term "injury" in
FELA, concluding that "[t ] he language [of FELA] is as broad as could be framed...
[making] every injury suffered by any employee while employed by reason of the
carrier's negligence . . . compensable." Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181
(1949). As a result, the Buell Court implicitly modified Urie's "all-inclusive" con-
struction of the term "injury." See Buell, 480 U.S. at 570 (concluding that whether
emotional injuries are cognizable under FELA is not purely question of statutory
construction). For a discussion of the Buell holding, see supra notes 60-65 and
accompanying text.
201. See Buell, 480 U.S. at 570 (concluding that compensability of emotional
injuries is not "susceptible to an all-inclusive 'yes' or 'no' answer"). The Buell
Court stated that it was inappropriate to consider the issue of emotional injuries as
"an abstract point of law or a pure question of statutory construction," which was
the approach followed in Urie. See id. (referring to general rationale of Urie
holding).
202. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97 (holding that when it is reasonably foreseeable
that extended exposure to dangerous and stressful working conditions will cause
injury, employer may be held liable under FELA for employee's resulting injuries).
For a discussion of several more persuasive grounds upon which, to base the Carlisle
holding, see infra notes 205-35 and accompanying text.
203. See Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 437 (1958) (noting
that federal courts must "evolve" FELAjurisprudence in same manner as common
law). For a discussion of how Kernan provides a basis for the Third Circuit's hold-
ing in Carlisle, see infra notes 205-20 and accompanying text. For an additional
discussion of the similarities between the Kernan and Buell holdings, see infra notes
209-10 and accompanying text.
204. See Buell 480 U.S. at 568 (acknowledging that FELA jurisprudence "gle-
ans guidance from common-law developments"). For a discussion of how the Car-
1994] NOTE
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1. Kernan as Precedent for the Carlisle Decision
The Supreme Court in Kernan interpreted FELA as establishing a "sys-
tem of . . . compensation for injuries to employees consistent with the
changing realities of employment in the railroad industry."20 5 According
to the rationale of Kernan, the dangers faced by railroad workers would
change as the industry matured.20 6 Consequently, as the risks of railroad
employment change, so also should FELA's remedies. The Kernan deci-
sion reflects an understanding that the risks in railroad employment could
change over time, and therefore, provides a more persuasive basis for the
Carlisle holding.
Unlike Urie, the Kernan decision was not limited by the Court's hold-
ing in BuelL20 7 In fact, Kernan and Buell interpreted FELA in a similar
manner. Specifically, the Kernan Court construed FELA as evolving "much
in the manner of the common law," 208 while the Buell Court interpreted
the scope of FELA in accordance with "developing legal principles." 20 9
Both of the Court's holdings essentially acknowledge the need to interpret
FELA as evolving in accordarce with changes in the railroad industry.2 10
lisle holding is consistent with common law developments concerning negligent
infliction of emotional distress, see infra notes 221-35 and accompanying text.
205. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 437. For a discussion of the Kernan's factual back-
ground and holding, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
206. See Kernan, 355 U.S. at 432 (observing that Congress in creating FELA
intended no static remedy, but one Which would develop and enlarge to meet
changing conditions in railroad industry). Although the Court in Buell refused to
rule on the issue of emotional injuries under FELA, the Kernan Court construed
FELA to be a broad remedial statute that is responsive to changes in the railroad
industry. Id. In view of the Kernan Court's interpretation, it is clear that FELA was
enacted to provide a remedy for dangerous working conditions, even if caused by
job-related stress. See Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 368 (3d
Cir. 1993) (recognizing that humanitarian policy concerns articulated in Kernah
regarding FELA do not change with nature of injury), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
For a discussion, of the view that Congress intended FELA to develop and expand
to meet the work-related hazards currently facing railroad workers, see supra note
57 and accompanying text.
207. Compare Buell, 480 U.S. at 570 ("(B]road pronouncements in this area
[FELA jurisprudence] may have to bow to the precise application of developing
legal principles to the particular facts at hand.") with Kernan, 355 U.S. at 437 ("[B]y
using generalized language, it [Congress] created only a framework within which
the courts were left to evolve, much in the manner of the common law, a system of
principles [for] providing compensation [under FELA] .... ") and Urie v. Thomp-
son, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) ("The language [of FELA] is as broad as could be framed
208. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 437.
209. See Buell 480 U.S. at 568-70 (concluding that scope of FELA with regard
to emotional injuries must be determined in light of common-law developments).
210. See id. at 570 (acknowledging need for continued development of legal
principles in FELAjurisprudence); Kernan, 355 U.S. at 437 (recognizing that FELA
jurisprudence must be developed to reflect "changing realities of employment in
the railroad industry").
232 [Vol. 39: p. 197
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The Kernan rationale is clearly relevant in view of the recent changes
that have taken place in the railroad industry over the last twenty years. 21 1
Facing heavy competition in the freight transportation business,2 1 2 many
railroads have streamlined operations in order to be price competitive by
significantly reducing their work forces and assigning greater responsibili-
ties to the remaining employees. 21 3 While the physical dangers associated
211. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Ask and Ye Shall Receive: The Legislative Response to
the Northeast Rail Crisis, 28 VILL. L. REv. 272, 298 (1983) (observing that financial
problems were sapping viability of railroad system in northeastern United States
and necessitated changes in structure of operations). During the decades of the
1960s and 1970s, all railroads in the northeast region were suffering financial
problems. Id. at 298. One of the primary causes of the regional railroads' finan-
cial problems was excessive labor costs. Id. at 285. Labor costs were rising out of
control because railroads were forced by the labor unions to assure job security for
all railroad workers. Id. at 286. Consequently, railroads were unable to reduce
labor costs through workforce reductions. See id. (concluding that assuring job
security imposed economic burden on railroads). Major change in the railroad
industry did not come easy. See Agis Salpukas, How Railroads Cut Jobs Without Draw-
ing Blood, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, § 3, at 9 (citing Union Pacific as example of
railroad that was slow to institute major changes).
With the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat.
1895 (codified in various sections of 11, 45, 49 U.S.C. (1992), which promoted
competition in the rail industry, railroads began, to make drastic reductions in
their workforce. Lawrence H. Kaufman, Market Likely to Reflect Rail Labor Differences,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1992, at B2 (noting that "railroads .... will try to grow their
businesses by using lower labor costs"). In fact, during the 1980s more than 50%
of the rank and file were eliminated. Lawrence Kaufman, Inside Talk, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1992, at B2 (reporting that railroad carriers have reduced their employ-
ment more than 50% since deregulation at end of 1980). Industry analysts expect
short-term reductions in the workforce to continue. Id. Specifically, with regard to
Conrail, Congress enacted The Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 (NERSA) which,
inter alia, permitted Conrail to reduce annual labor costs and to restructure train
operations. Perritt, supra, at 350. Less than three years later,' Conrail sharply re-
duced its workforce, including drastic reductions in the train dispatcher's depart-
ment in Philadelphia. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 92.
212. See Perritt, supra note 211, at 280 (noting that competitive trucking in-
dustry was factor affecting profitability of railroads); Salpukas, supra note 211, at 9
(noting that truckers are in direct competition with railroads); James Schwartz,
What's New in Freight Trains; A Struggle to Shrink the Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1989, § 3, at 13 (reporting that truckers have kept prices lower than railroads and
have grabbed market share).
213. Salpukas, supra note 211, at 9. Since 1980, major freight railroads have
cut their workforces in half. Id. For example, Union Pacific has cut its workforce
by nearly 36% and has gone from 45,000 employees to, 29,000 employees. Id.
Other carriers took similar action during the decade. See,, e.g., CN Rail May Slash
10,000 Jobs in Next 5 Years to Control Costs, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Nov. 30, 1992,§ B, at 4 (reporting that CN North America plans to reduce workforce by 30%);
Reuters, CSX Reports Loss: 25% of Staff to be Cut, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1988, § 1, at 33
(noting that CSX Corporation laid off about 8,200 employees or 25% of payroll).
Similarly, Norfolk Southern Corporation and Southern Pacific Transportation
Company cut their workforce by nearly 30%. See Southern Pacific Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1985, at D5 (reporting that in largest job cut in 123 years, Southern Pa-
cific was slashing workforce by 10,000 employees); Norfolk Will Trim 5,000Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1987, at D5 (noting that Norfolk Southern was eliminating 5,000
jobs as part of cost-cutting restructuring). As a result of the workforce reductions,
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with railroad employment have declined dramatically,2 1 4 the risks associ-
ated with unreasonably dangerous and stressful work conditions have in-
creased.21 5 Therefore, under Kernan, federal courts should expand the
remedies provided by FELA to address the growing problem of stressful
work conditions in the railroad industry.
Under the Kernan rationale, the plaintiff in Carlisle was a victim of
Conrail's cost-cutting and streamlining efforts in three ways.2 16 First, the
plaintiff was forced to assume far greater responsibility as a result of work
force cuts at Conrail.2 1 7 Second, he was under constant pressure to keep
the trains running on schedule, despite Conrail's aging railstock and out-
dated switching equipment.21 8 Third, the plaintiff was required to work
long and erratic hours as a result of work force reductions.2 19 Because
these factors contributed significantly to the plaintiff's stressful working
conditions, the Carlisle court could have easily used the Kernan decision to
support its holding that dangerous work-related stress is compensable
under FELA.22
0
2. Carlisle Consistent with Common Law Developments
State common law further supports the holding in Carlisle.22 1 In Bu-
ell, the Supreme Court acknowledged that developments in the common
law concerning emotional distress claims would have significant influence
worker productivity has soared. Salpukas, supra note 211, at 9. In other words,
railroad employees are working a great deal harder than in past years.
214. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that only 40 railroad
employees were killed on duty in 1984 as compared to 11,839 in 1907).
215. See, e.g., Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir.
1993), rev'd sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994)
(asserting that workforce reductions in train dispatcher's office created dangerous
and stressful working conditions); Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F. Supp.
1073, 1075-76 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (alleging that consolidation of job responsibilities
caused stress-related injuries), appeal dismissed, 899 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1990); Mc-
Millan v. Western Pac. R.R., 357 P.2d 449, 449 (Cal. 1960) (concluding that com-
plexity of train dispatcher's job and extreme responsibility caused nervous
collapse). As a result, the risks of working on the railroad have changed.
216. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 92. For a discussion of the factual background of
Carlisle, see supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
217. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 92.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 92, 97.
221. Id. at 97-98 (upholding FELA claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress caused by work-related stress). The Supreme Court in Buell has indicated
that common law developments regarding negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress should serve as a guidepost for determining whether emotional injuries are
cognizable under FELA. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557,
568 (1987). For a discussion of how recent developments in state common law
provide an alternative basis on which to support the Carlisle holding, see infra notes
222-35 and accompanying text.
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on whether emotional injuries are compensable under FELA.222 Accord-
ingly, the Carlisle court performed a cursory review of state common law
regarding the standards for recovery of damages for emotional injuries.2 2 3
Finding little consensus among the states,224 the court in Carlisle was un-
able to glean guidance from such common law developments. 225 The Car-
lisle court, however, failed to recognize that a trend among the states has
developed regarding standards for recovery for emotional injuries. 226
An examination of the relevant common law indicates that a growing
number of states allow recovery for emotional injuries when: 1) there is
some "physical manifestation" of the emotional injury22 7 or 2) there is
evidence of "severe emotional distress."228 The Carlisle court's conclusion
222. See Buel4 480 U.S. at 568, 570 (concluding that determination of whether
emotional injuries are cognizable under FELA requires application of developing
legal principles to facts of case); see also Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., 2 F.3d 480,
482-83 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing that Buell found FELA jurisprudence to be
guided by common law developments); Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988
F.2d 355, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that Buell directed federal courts to seek
guidance from common law in determining degree to which negligent infliction of
emotional distress is compensable under FELA), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994); El-
liot v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 910 F.2d 1224, 1227-28 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
Buell analysis requires examination of common law prior to determining whether
emotional injuries are cognizable under FELA).
223. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94-95. For a discussion of the Carlisle court's review
of the common law, see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
224. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 94.
225. Id. at 94-95 (citing W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Right to RecoverforEmotional
Disturbance or its Physical Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable
Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103 (1959) and Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of
Mental Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based
on an Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REv. 781, 782-
817 (1988)).
226. See id. at 94 (finding wide divergence in views among states regarding
approach to recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress). A majority of
states follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A which requires evidence of
physical manifestations of emotional injuries to recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 921 (N.D. 1989) (citing
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 54 (5th ed.
1984)). For a discussion of the majority trend among state courts, see supra note
143.
227. For a list of states which permit recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress upon a showing of "physical manifestations," see supra note 143.
228. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (con-
cluding that cause of action may be stated for negligent infliction of serious emo-
tional distress); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (requiring
serious mental distress to establish cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (holding
that emotional distress must be sufficiently severe so as to be medically significant);
Johnson v. Supersave Mkts., Inc., 686 P.2d 209, 213 (Mont. 1984) (concluding that
emotional distress is compensable inter alia when tortious conduct causes signifi-
cant impact upon plaintiff); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 113
(Ohio 1983) (allowing cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
where proof of serious emotional injury); see also Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 923 (re-
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that work-related stress is compensable under FELA2 29 is justifiable under
both the physical manifestation test and the severe emotional distress
test.2 30 Under the physical manifestation test, the plaintiff's emotional
viewing jurisdictions which require serious or severe emotional distress in place of
bodily harm).
Several states have rejected the physical manifestation requirement as a limita-
tion on recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Baptist Medical Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (dispensing with bodily
harm requirement for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Molien, 616 P.2d
at 820 (holding that the "unqualified requirement of physical injury is no longer
justifiable" to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Mon-
tinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978)
(holding that recovery for unintentionally-caused emotional distress does not de-
pend on proof of ensuing physical injury or risk of harm from physical impact);
Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 519 (stating that the standard of proof for mental distress
claim is some guarantee of genuineness); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108
(Iowa 1981) (establishing serious emotional distress as element required for recov-
ery of bystander claim for emotional distress and dispensing with physical manifes-
tation requirement); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438
(Me. 1982) (rejecting requirement of physical manifestation of emotional injury
and establishing instead requirement of serious emotional distress); Bass, 646
S.W.2d at 772-73 (avoiding any physical injury requirement and permitting recov-
ery for emotional injury when medically diagnosable and medically significant);
Johnson, 686 P.2d at 213 (noting that recovery for mental distress is allowed absent
showing of physical injury where tortious conduct has had significant impact on
plaintiff); James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1985) (concluding that physi-
cal manifestation of psychological injury may be highly persuasive but such proof
not necessary in action for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Portee v.
Jaffe, 417 A.2d '521, 527-28 (N.J. 1980) (acknowledging that bystander recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress is permissible where inter alia plaintiff
establishes severe emotional distress); Schultz, 447 N.E.2d at 113 (rejecting contem-
poraneous physical injury requirement for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress in favor of proof of serious emotional distress); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672,
679 (Pa. 1979) (concluding that psychic injury can be proven in absence of physi-
cal manifestation of such injury). In fact, some commentators predict that the
physical manifestation requirement is destined for extinction. John E. Flanagan,
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a Recognized Tort
Action, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 557 (1984); see McCarthy, supra note 64, at 27-29. (discuss-
ing trend toward recognition of emotional well-being as interest worthy of legal
protection in and of itself). Moreover, virtually all of the states have rejected the
strict requirement of physical impact as a prerequisite to recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S.
557, 570 n.20 (1987).
229. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97. For a discussion of the specific limitations on
work-related stress claims as articulated by the Carlisle court in its holding, see supra
note 177 and accompanying text.
230. See Marlowe, supra note 48, at 800-01, 824 (discussing cases in which
mental distress was actionable either upon showing of "physical manifestation" or
"degree of mental distress suffered"). For a discussion of the physical manifesta-
tion test and the severe emotional distress test, see supra notes 143, 228. In addi-
tion, see supra note 142, which indicates that the objectives of each test are
significantly different. But see Sinn, 404 A.2d at 679 (observing that physical mani-
festation of emotional injuries is highly persuasive evidence of severe emotional
injury); Culbert, 444 A.2d at 437 (noting that although objective symptoms are not
necessary, they may constitute 'highly persuasive evidence of severe mental dis-
tress). However, in view of the fact that a majority of states favors one of these
236 [Vol. 39: p. 197
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss1/5
1994] NOTE 237
injury must cause some physical injury.23 ' The plaintiff in Carlisle suf-
fered, inter alia, depression, loss of weight and a nervous breakdown.
23 2
These symptoms are sufficient evidence of "physical injury" to require
compensation of the plaintiff's emotional injuries. 233
Under the severe emotional distress test, a plaintiff must assert an
emotional injury which is both medically diagnosable and medically signif-
icant.2 3 4 Symptoms of a nervous breakdown and depression have been
found to be both medically diagnosable and significant.235 Therefore, the
plaintiff in Carlisle would also meet the severe emotional distress test and
recover for his emotional injuries.
V. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's holding in Carlisle strikes an equitable balance
between a railroad employee's interest in safe working conditions and a
railroad's fear of excessive and frivolous litigation arising from unre-
strained emotional distress claims.23 6 With regard to working conditions,
the Carlisle decision would have enabled victims of dangerously stressful
work conditions to seek just compensation for genuine emotional inju-
ries.23 7 Job-related stress is a reality in the modern work place. 238 Na-
tional studies confirm that work-related'stress pervades all occupations
and affects the psychological well-being of millions of American employ-
tests, the Carlisle court correctly applied Buel's "developing legal principles" of the
common law to the facts of the case. See Buell, 480 U.S. at 570 (concluding that
"broad pronouncements... [regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress]
may have to bow to the precise application of developing legal principles to the
particular facts at hand").
231. For a discussion of examples of physical manifestations as contemplated
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see supra note 143.
232. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 92.. For a discussion of the factual background of
Carlisle, see supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
233. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97 n.Il (noting that plaintiff's emotional injury
was accompanied by "obvious physical manifestations," including depression, loss
of weight and nervous breakdown). For common law examples of cases in which
courts permitted recovery for similar physical injuries, see supra note 143.
234. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983). For a list of
other jurisdictions that require proof of serious emotional distress, see supra note
228.
235. See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (concluding that
decisive weight loss constitutes evidence of severe emotional distress).
236. For a discussion of the Carlisle court's holding, see supra notes 136-73
and accompanying text. For a discussion of how the court's decision struck an
equitable balance between the competing interests of labor and management, see
supra notes 174-97 and accompanying text.
237. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2419 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that "appropriate FELA claim threshold
should be keyed to the genuineness and gravity of the worker's injury"). For a
discussion of how Carlisle protects the interests of railroad employees, see supra
notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
238. Pompeani, supra note 194 at 43 (citing Ryan v. Connor, 503 N.E.2d 1379,
1381-82 (Ohio 1986)).
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ees.23 9 Until Carlisle, few circuit courts recognized that FELA imposes a
duty to provide an emotionally safe workplace on railroads.240 Thus, as
Justice Ginsburg observed in her Gottshall II dissent, the Carlisle court's
decision would have served as a powerful incentive for railroads to protect
employees from foreseeable and dangerous work-related stress.
24
'
The Carlisle decision also carefully limited recovery to "foreseeable"
emotional injuries that are the result of "extended exposure to dangerous
and stressful working conditions."2 42 AsJustice Ginsburg alluded to in her
dissent, this limitation on the scope of FELA would have also protected
railroads from potentially excessive and frivolous litigation 2 4 3 because the
potential for an explosion of work-related stress claims is staggering.
244
239. Id. at 35 (citing United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Pro-
posed National Strategy for the Prevention of Psychological Disorders, Pub. No.
89-137 (1988)).
240. For a discussion of the circuit courts that have either refused to allow
recovery for emotional injuries under FELA or avoided the issue altogether, see
supra notes 82-101 and accompanying text.
241. See Gottshall I 114 S. Ct. at 2419 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (acknowledg-
ing that Carlisle holding would provide "severely harmed workers" remedy for inju-
ries suffered). For a discussion of how the Carlisle holding will motivate railroads
to protect employees from dangerous work-related stress, see supra notes 179-81
and accompanying text.
242. Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd
sub nom. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
243. See Gottshall II, 114 S. Ct. at 2418 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that requirement of "objective medical proof" would limit number of "insubstan-
tial" FELA claims). For a discussion of how the Carlisle holding will protect rail-
roads from excessive and frivolous litigation, see supra notes 179-81 and
accompanying text.
244. See Pompeani, supra note 194, at 36 (observing that some commentators
fear that predicted increase in stress-related claims will destroy some state workers
compensation systems). A useful comparison can be made between the FELA tort
compensation system and state workers compensation systems because both share
similar goals: providing just compensation for work-related injuries. Schwartz &
Mahshigian, supra note 19, at 2 (acknowledging that FELA and no-fault workers
compensations schemes were created to provide compensation for employees in-
jured at work). Although there are obvious differences, several meaningful simi-
larities exist between FELA and state workers compensation systems. First, both
FELA and state workers compensation statutes were developed to provide lost com-
pensation to workers and their families during periods of work-related disabilities,
and to encourage employers to provide safe working conditions for their employ-
ees. Schrimpf, supra note 193, at 589-90. Second, both FELA and most state work-
ers compensation systems were developed before the advent of claims for mental
distress. Id. Consequently, similar to federal courts in FELA cases, state courts
have confronted the issue of whether the term "injury," within their relevant work-
ers compensation statutes, encompasses emotional injuries. See, e.g., Gontar, supra
note 193, at 319 (noting that Louisiana Supreme Court found mental injuries to
be compensable under state workers compensation statute); Pompeani, supra note
194, at 48 (noting that Ohio courts have sought to determine whether term "in-
jury" as contained in Ohio Workers Compensation Act encompasses stress-related
emotional injuries); Kim Nickell, Note, Gradual Stress: Compensable Under Worker's
Compensation Law, 56 U. Mo. KAN. CiTY L. REv. 567, 571-73 (1988) (observing that
Missouri courts have interpreted statutory term "injury" in their respective workers
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compensation acts to include certain emotional injuries). Finally, some authorities
contend that as a result of the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of FELA with
respect to the tort elements of negligence and causation, the FELA tort system has
virtually evolved into a "no-fault" system, similar to workers compensation.
Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 19, at 7. There are also several differences
between FELA and state workers compensation systems. The first difference re-
lates to the issue of employer negligence. Unlike FELA, workers compensation
systems are not fault based. Schrimpf, supra note 193, at 593. But see Schwartz &
Mahshigian, supra note 19, at 7 (arguing that Supreme Court's liberal interpreta-
tion of FELA that requires minimal showing of employer negligence moves FELA
much closer to "no-fault" system' such as workers compensation). Consequently,
workers are not required to prove that employer negligence caused their injuries.
Schrimpf, supra note 193, at 598. The second difference between FELA and work-
ers compensation systems involves the procedures required to bring an injury
claim. Under the FELA tort system, railroad workers must initiate suit against their
employers in federal court. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 19, at 7 (noting
that employees seeking recovery under FELA must assert successful tort action for
negligence). On the other hand, injured employees covered by workers compen-
sations systems must bring their claims before an administrative agency. Taylor,
supra note 20, at 27. The final difference between the two systems relates to the
compensation that can be obtained for employee injuries. Under FELA, workers
may recover damages for lost wages and pain and suffering. Schwartz & Mah-
shigian, supra note 19, at 8. Employees covered by workers compensation systems,
however, are entitled only to lost wages and medical expenses associated with the
time the employee was out of work. Id. at 14.
The current explosion of work-related stress claims in many state workers
compensation systems illustrates the potential liability that railroad employers
could face if unrestrained claims for work-related stress were permitted under
FELA. See Taylor, supra note 20, at 27 (noting that damage awards paid by employ-
ers would arise from jury awards and settlement agreements). For example, some
state workers compensation systems have begun to allow recovery for certain work-
related stress disabilities. See, e.g., Wade v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 634, 638-
40 (Alaska 1987) (allowing workers compensation claim for job-related stress);
Sloss v. Indus. Comm'n, 588 P.2d 303, 304 (Ariz. 1978) (permitting recovery for
work-related stress upon showing of "unexpected, the unusual, or extraordinary
stress"); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 487 P.2d
278, 282 (Haw. 1971) (sustaining workers compensation claim for mental collapse
attributable to pressures of work); Albanese's Case, 389 N.E.2d 83, 84 (Mass. 1979)
(holding that an "employee [who] is incapacitated by mental or emotional disorder
causally related to a series of specific stressful work-related incidents" is entitled to
workers compensation); Caron v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 27, 594 A.2d 560,
562 (Me. 1991) (allowing workers compensation claim for job-related stress upon
showing of "extraordinary and unusual" pressure); Deziel v. Difco Lab., Inc., 268
N.W.2d 1, 12 (Mich. 1978) (permitting recovery under state workers compensation
statute for work-related stress when there is evidence of "personal injury"); Fought
v. Stuart C. Irby, Co. 523 So. 2d 314, 317 (Miss. 1988) (allowing recovery for
mental injury under workers compensation when injury caused by "something
more than the ordinary incidents of employment");,New Hampshire Supply Co. v.
Steinberg, 400 A.2d 1163, 1168 (N.H. 1979) (recognizing that heart attack caused
by job-related mental stress could be compensable by workers compensation);
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 330 N.E.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that
claim for nervous injury suffered in course of employment is recoverable under
workers compensation); Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 568 A.2d 159, 164 (Pa. 1990)
(acknowledging that mental illness is compensable when caused by "abnormal
working conditions"); Rega v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 475 A.2d 213, 217
(R.I. 1984) (holding that employee Who suffered nervous breakdown caused by
work-related stress is entitled to benefits provided by workers compensation); Mc-
1994] NOTE
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Under Carlisle, however, frivolous claims by employees that allege isolated
incidents of work-related stress or working a significant amount of over-
time would have been dismissed.2 45 Furthermore, by requiring that the
resulting emotional injuries be "reasonably foreseeable," the Carlisle deci-
sion would have protected railroads from excessive litigation for unex-
pected emotional injuries. 246
Christopher M. Shields
Whorter v. South Carolina Dep't of Ins., 165 S.E.2d 365, 365 (S.C. 1969) (consider-
ing workers compensation claim that job-related stress caused fatal heart attack);
Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 240 N.W.2d 128,
130 (Wis. 1976) (allowing recovery for "stresses and strains which were out of the
ordinary"); Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874, 877 (Wyo. 1984) (al-
lowing claim for mental injury caused by conditions of employment that are of
"greater magnitude than the day-to-day stresses and tensions all employees usually
experience"); see also Pompeani, supra note 194, at 52 nn.85-90. Given the magni-
tude of claims already filed by workers, recent commentators fear that the pro-
jected increases in work-related stress claims will bankrupt some state systems.
Pompeani, supra note 194, at 36; see Christy L. DeVader & Andrea Giampetro-
Meyer, Reducing Managerial Distress About Stress: An Analysis and Evaluation of Alter-
natives for Reducing Stress-Based Workers'Compensation Claims, 31 SANTA CLARA L. Rv.
1, 5 (1990) (observing that work-related claims for workers compensation are plac-
ing heavy burden on state systems).
The lesson from the comparison of the FELA tort compensation system with
other state workers compensation systems is simple: If unchecked, FELA could
face the specter of unrestrained claims for work-related emotional injuries. See
Pompeani, supra note 194 at 36-37 (noting that many state workers compensation
systems are currently facing specter of unrestrained claims for work-related emo-
tional injuries). Such an explosion of claims could threaten the financial stability
of the railroad industry. For a discussion of the potential liability faced by employ-
ers if FELA were construed to permit unrestrained claims for work-related stress,
see supra discussion. Therefore, limiting plaintiff's claims to those involving "ex-
tended exposure" to "dangerous and stressful working conditions" protects em-
ployers from the destructive effects of unrestrained claims for work-related stress.
For a discussion of how the requirements of "extended exposure" and "dangerous
and stressful working conditions" serve to limit employer liability for work-related
stress claims, see supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
245. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97 (requiring extended exposure to dangerous
work-related stress); see also Gottshall I1, 114 S. Ct. at 2418 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting)
(proposing requirement of "objective medical proof" as means of limiting "insub-
stantial" FELA claims).
246. See Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 97 (emphasizing that emotional injuries must be
reasonably foreseeable result of work-related stress). For a discussion regarding
the Carlisle court's emphasis on providing railroads a reasonable opportunity to
gain notice of the allegedly dangerous and stressful working conditions, see supra
notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
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